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One of the visible legacies of Russia in China which reflect the ambivalence of the relationship 
in own ways, are cemeteries. While the most well-known of “foreigners’ cemeteries” in China 
today is in Shanghai, “hosting” mostly dead from the Western hemisphere in its present form and 
being conveniently located in the inner-city “Song Qingling Memorial Park” where it is 
integrated with the tombs of “famous Chinese” to flank the central figure of Song Qingling 宋庆
龄 (Madame Sun Yat-sen) and her parents,2 the largest extant “foreigners’ cemetery” in China is 
Russian and in Manchuria:
3
 the so-called “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Lüshun 旅顺,  formerly 
known in the West as “Port Arthur” (and now part of Dalian 大连 municipality). Notably, this 
cemetery is today part of Chinese patriotic education programs to honor the “martyrs” who died 
for the “liberation of China” from the Japanese in 1945, thus assigning to these foreigners a role 
in Chinese self-definition. De facto, this cemetery, though, not only “hosts” “Soviet Martyrs” (be 
it of the so-called “August Storm” of 1945,4 be it of the Korean War 1950-1953), but also the 
remains of people linked to tsarist times, most prominently to the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904/05, which in Chinese eyes was a war fought between two foreign imperialists on Chinese 
(and Korean) soil.
5
 Thus, these dead stand for imperial Russia’s “aggression” in China, and their 
memorialization is anathema to the Chinese. This way, the cemetery, together with two further 
ones in the Dalian area where the Soviet Union held extraordinary rights after WW II well into 
the PRC (People’s Republic of China) times, embodies the tension and ambivalence surrounding 
Russian historical legacy in China.  
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank my colleagues of the German-Russian project on “Chinese Perceptions of Russia and the 
West during the 20th century” for help with various details. For the financing of the necessary fieldwork, I am 
grateful to the DFG. A special thanks is due to my research assistant Anastasiia Dmitrenko. Several Chinese and 
Russian colleagues also helped with access to the cemeteries or to some materials. 
2
 See my previous study: Gotelind Müller: Between History, Heritage and Foreign Relations: Extant Westerners’ 
Cemeteries in Guangzhou and Shanghai, Heidelberg: CrossAsia-Repository 2018(a), pp. 13-31. Available online: 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.11588/xarep.00004163. Of the once substantial group of Russians in Shanghai, only few still 
appear in the “foreigners’ cemetery” in the “Song Qingling Memorial Park”. Cf. those individuated by Viktoriya 
Sharonova: Nekropol’ russkogo Shankhaiya (Necropolis of Russian Shanghai), Moscow: Staraya Basmannaya 2013, 
pp. XXXII-XXXVI . 
3
 The discussion of the appropriateness of the term “Manchuria” for the area which in China today is called “the 
Northeast” will not be repeated here: suffice it to say that I will keep the term here because it suggests a special 
characteristic of the area which has been under the influence of Russia (and Japan) in modern times that will concern 
us here. 
4
 On the “August Storm” from the Soviet side of things, see David M. Glantz: Soviet Operational and Tactical 
Combat in Manchuria, 1945: “August Storm”, London and Portland: Frank Cass 2003. 
5
 For various Chinese perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War at the time of the war itself, see Gotelind Müller: 
"Chinesische Perspektiven auf den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg" (Chinese Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War) 
in: Sprotte, Maik / Seifert, Wolfgang / Löwe, Heinz-Dietrich (eds.): Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05: 
Anbruch einer neuen Zeit? (The Russo-Japanese War 1904/05: Dawn of a New Era?), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 
2007, pp. 203-239. English version: Chinese Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War, Heidelberg: Heidelberg 
University Library 2013. Available online: DOI: 10.11588/heidok.00015406.  




While Lüshun and Dalian mark the southern end of the railway the Russians once built through 
Manchuria to connect to their East-West-linking Trans-Siberian Railway, at the northern nodal 
point in Manchuria, Harbin (Haerbin 哈尔滨),6  Chinese perceived ambivalence of Russian 
legacy is further augmented due to the particularly strong influence of Russian (“White”) émigré 
culture in the interwar years there. In fact, to those opposing and fleeing the Soviets, Harbin was 
usually the first choice in the Far East. Still, not all “Russians” in the city belonged to this group, 
which means that Harbin hosted a mix of different political and religious outlooks. This, too, is 
reflected in the cemeteries where, in fact, three are extant today: one Orthodox, one Jewish, and 
an extra one for the Soviets since 1945, the smallest of the three here. Harbin, too, provides a 
“superlative” in claiming the “largest Jewish cemetery of East Asia”, most of the dead being, 
again, Russian. While many Jews were present in China also elsewhere, most notably in 
Shanghai, only Harbin has kept a large cemetery which is nowadays playing an important role in 
Sino-Israeli relations,
7
 while the Orthodox and the Soviet cemetery involve, above all,
8
 Sino-
Russian relations. Thus, the cases presented below reflect the multi-facetted influence of Russia 
in China: between early Tsarists, later “Whites” and Soviets in terms of politics, and Russian 
Orthodox and Jews in terms of religion. Furthermore, the “Japanese factor” for much of the time 
before the PRC was established, cannot be totally ignored either. Seen from the Chinese side, 
finally, the dealing with the remains involved the issues of imperialism, colonialism, revolution 
and heritage in both their domestic and international-diplomatic dimensions. 
 
For contextualization, it should be pointed out that the cases addressed here, Harbin, Dalian 
(including Jinzhou 金州) and Lüshun, cannot claim to be the only Russian cemeteries in China 
still extant, though these are typically concentrated in Manchuria and along the railway line, 
making Manchuria the most pertinent area for the topic. Apart from some tombs connected to 
Soviet help to China in the early Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) in the larger Yangzi region, 
typically by aviators Stalin had sent to Guomindang 国民党 (National Party)-governed China, 
there are some places closer to the border in Xinjiang and Mongolia (of which the “inner” part is 
PRC territory today) with casualties of 1945, i.e. the very last days of WW II. At some places in 
“China proper” like Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Wuhan and Shanghai where Russians had settled 
in greater numbers since the late 19th century over a somewhat longer period of time, the 
Russian cemeteries have, however, disappeared (as have most of the one-time “foreigners’” 
cemeteries in China). In all of China and in Manchuria in particular, apart from civilian dead at 
the places of Russian residential presence, the military was a very sizable group of those buried. 
                                                          
6
 I follow the most widely used form of transcribing the city as “Harbin” in English instead of Chinese “Haerbin” (or 
the romanized Russian “Kharbin”).  
7
 For Shanghai, where several single Jewish tombstones of the once large Jewish cemeteries have been found but 
only a memorial to the Jewish presence has been set up in the new Chinese Fushouyuan 福寿园 Cemetery, cf. the 
brief comments in Müller (2018a), pp. 31-32. 
8
 It should be kept in mind that the break-up of the Soviet Union means that today more countries are de facto 
involved, though Russia, of course, dominates. 




Major conflicts involved the Boxer Uprising (1900/1901) which spread from Northern China 
also into Manchuria, and then, most importantly, the Russo-Japanese War (1904/05) which 
affected, again, mainly the southern part of Manchuria (and neighboring Korea). Still, since the 
railway was the main South-North link through Manchuria and back to Russia, wounded and 
dead were often transferred to major nodal points and thus were also “centrally buried”. This was 
helped by the fact that the railway zone, i.e. a strip of land along the railway, was leased to the 
Russians by the Qing since 1898 to ward off Japanese influence, where the Russians could freely 
decide on the land usage, although the Russians lost the southern part of that leased territory 
soon to the Japanese due to their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.  
 
After the traumatic Russo-Japanese War and the troubled times of the 1905 Russian Revolution, 
the Tsar ordered a first survey of Russian military tombs and cemeteries in Manchuria to be 
made, and in 1912 had several large crosses built to commemorate those soldiers that had lost 
their lives for “faith, Tsar and fatherland”. A 1938 Russian source, tellingly titled “Forgotten 
Graves”, from Harbin provides a glimpse into the state of Russian tombs and cemeteries up to 
the by then Manchukuo times. Here, a map shows clearly the locations being orientated along the 
railway.
9
 As mentioned, these Russian dead, though, are anathema to the Chinese and thus their 
tombs had less chance to survive after 1945. Only where a large group of Russians was still 
living, most notably in Harbin, or came with the Red Army to stay for a substantial time as in the 
Dalian-Lüshun area 1945-1955, they could look after the Russian tombs, Soviet and – at times – 
pre-Soviet, which also explains the feasibility to focus on these in the present study since they 
reflect the broader Russian legacy (and its preceived ambivalence) in China and are not only 
one-dimensionally Soviet.  
 
Most of the still extant Russian cemeteries in Manchuria (and elsewhere in China), thus, are the 
less controversial Soviet ones, and they are usually connected to the fight against the Japanese, 
namely to the Soviet “August Storm” of 1945 to drive out and subdue the Japanese. Some of the 
tombs and memorials are further away from the railway and closer to the battle fields, often 
located at the borders.
10
 The memorials and steles set up by the Soviets typically frame this as a 
                                                          
9
 See Zabytyya (sic! old form) mogily (Forgotten graves), Harbin: Izdatel’stvo M.B. Zajtseva 1938. Available online: 
https://vtoraya-literatura.com/pdf/zabytye%20mogily_1938__ocr.pdf. 
10
 See the overview of extant Soviet tombs and memorials in China from the Chinese side in Tian Zhihe田志和: 
Yongheng de huainian. Zhongguo tudishang de Sulian hongjun bei ta lingyuan 永恒的怀念。中国土地上的苏联红
军碑塔陵园 (Eternal cherishing: Monuments and Cemeteries for the Soviet Red Army on Chinese soil), Dalian: 
Dalian chubanshe 2010. Tian, himself a member of the Chinese Communist Party, had the advantage to have had 
access to archival materials for his research. See also the (incomplete) summary included in Ma Dianwen’s book on 
the Lüshun Cemetery: Ma Dianwen马殿文: Xuesa Zhonghua liuqingshi: Sujun lieshi lingyuan de gushi 血洒中华
留青史。苏军烈士陵园的故事 (History of [those] shedding their blood in China in their prime: the story of the 
Soviet martyrs’ cemetery), Dalian:  Liaoning shifan daxue chubanshe 2015, pp. 109-156.  




“victory over Japanese fascism” and in the “defense of” or “to the glory of the USSR”, at times 
even stating that the “heroes” (the preferred Soviet term) died “for Stalin”. In any case, Soviet 
inscriptions are typically Soviet-centered without much attention to China and the Chinese. In 
Chinese perspective, though, this was a “liberation” of Northeast China by the Soviets (together 
with some Chinese resistance fighters) from the Japanese, for which the “martyrs” (lieshi 烈士, 
the preferred Chinese term which the Chinese themselves invariable translate as “martyr” into 
English) laid down their lives. The Chinese steles to the Soviet “martyrs”, therefore, rather stress 
the issues of internationalism and friendship in the “common fight” against the “common 
enemy”. 11 One may note that in Chinese (modern) understanding, the term lieshi implies dying 
for “the cause”, while the Russian term “hero” (geroy) as such is less restricted in application 
and in that sense is also used in Chinese as yingxiong 英雄 (hero). In other words, an yingxiong 
may live on, while a lieshi does not. The strong Christian connotation of the term “martyr” who 
however does not seek martyrdom vis-à-vis the “hero” of whom the personal choice and agency 
is of primary importance, probably made for the Soviet preference for the latter term, while the 
Chinese felt the necessity to single out the blood price a lieshi paid, evoking ancient concepts of 
loyalty (and following up on Guomindang practices).
12
 In spite of the rocky relationship of the 
PRC with the Soviet Union after the 1950s, the Soviet tombs and cemeteries survived, though 
they were not necessarily spared of vandalism.
13
 Apart from the 1945 “August Storm”, also the 
Korean War (1950-1953) in which the Chinese participated officially and the Soviets unofficially, 
has left Soviet remains in the region. Thus, the cemeteries reflect also these histories in their own 
ways.  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet military tombs and cemeteries in China were 
looked into by the Russian Ministry of Defense, mainly since the mid-1990s when a survey was 
done and published in 1997 by Ivanov (a former participant in the “August Storm”) et al., though 
obviously with a very restricted circulation.
14
 In 2004 another Russian fact-finding mission 
toured China, and in 2007 an accord was signed between both governments on the protection of 
                                                          
11
 See the various inscriptions provided in Tian Zhihe who tellingly orders his description of steles and memorials in 
“Soviet made” and “Chinese made”.  
12
 This large topic cannot be addressed here in full. Suffice it to say that the archetypical lieshi of Chinese antiquity, 
Boyi伯夷 and Shuqi 叔齊, rather starved to death than serve the new dynasty. Whatever way a lieshi died, it was 
out of choice. The concept was attached to the nation not only with the Communists, but had been part of 
Guomindang state cult already and implied also various benefits for the relatives of those officially labeled a lieshi. 
One should also add that the Chinese Christians rather prefer other terms to translate “martyr”, usually combinations 
with the word xun 殉 (to die in sacrifice), while the character lie 烈 evokes rather fiery resistance than meekness. 
13
 Here, the Cultural Revolution left its mark as elsewhere in China, but probably due to the closeness to the border 
and the intervention of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), the tombs of the “liberating” Soviets were basically 
kept. Since archives are not accessible, the details of what exactly happened are, however, unclear, and present-day 
Chinese sources remain predictably vague regarding the topic. 
14
 See [V[asily] Ivanov et al.]: Vechnym snom spyat v Kitayskoy zemle: Memorial’ny al'bom (Resting eternally in 
Chinese soil: Memorial Album), Moscow: MAS 1997. I am grateful to Maxim Korolkov for helping me get access 
to this source. Ivanov et al. very briefly also address tsarist tombs of the Russo-Japanese War in an appendix. 




Soviet tombs in China. These events, though, were not greatly publicized in China although they 
were made public in Russia. In fact, one of the outcomes of this study was to realize the 
sometimes stark difference not only in perspective but also in communication policies between 
both sides, reflecting also the Chinese ambivalence towards the sites who likely wanted to 
diplomatically demonstrate care to the Russians, but at the same time keep it low-key 
domestically. The cases presented here, i.e. Harbin, Dalian (with Jinzhou) and Lüshun, in short, 
are not the only ones of Russian/Soviet cemeteries in China, but they are clearly the most 





Although this study will concentrate on the Russians, one word should be added about the 
Japanese who were so dominant in Manchuria, especially after they won the Russo-Japanese 
War in 1904/05 which meant that therewith they had the basic say in Southern Manchuria. Later 
on, they extended this to the North after 1931 in the wake of the so-called “Manchurian Incident” 
and the subsequent creation of the “puppet state” Manchukuo.16 The Japanese cemeteries have 
largely disappeared, helped also by the fact that the Japanese practiced cremation and, when and 
where possible, shipped the remains back to Japan, knowing all too well after their defeat in 
1945 that treatment would not be favorable, to say the least. Thus, the apparently only presently 
existing Japanese cemetery in Manchuria east of Harbin in Fangzheng 方正 county, is for those 
Japanese settlers who died in 1945/46, not making it out in time before the Soviet advance and 
being “abandoned” by their own army. These abandoned settlers were often interned there and 
died of starvation, diseases or suicide. The cemetery, though, was set up only many years later in 
PRC times in 1963 on (at least officially) private initiative and was relocated to the present site 
in 1984, when the Japanese Embassy also moved in newly discovered remains of collective 
suicides of Japanese abandoned settlers in 1945 elsewhere.
17
 The place is now called “Sino-
Japanese Friendship Garden”, but has seen disputes and vandalism by Chinese nationalists when 
a monument with the names of settlers was set up in 2011.
18
 The new monument thus was 
                                                          
15
 For a more complete picture of other extant Soviet cemeteries, see Tian Zhihe, Ma Dianwen, and Ivanov et al. 
Among the ones with larger numbers of Soviet dead are those in Hailar, Manzhouli, Qiqihar, Shenyang etc. 
16
 For the time before 1931, see Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka: The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932, 
Cambridge/Mass. and London: Harvard University Asia Center 2001. For the time around 1931 from the Chinese 
side of things, see Rana Mitter: The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern 
China, Berkeley et al.: University of California Press 2000. For the time after 1931, see Louise Young: Japan’s 
Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley et al.: University of California Press 
1998. On Manchukuo see Prasenjit Duara: Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, 
Lanham, Md. et al.: Rowman & Littlefield 2004. 
17
 Cf. Yeeshan Chan: Abandoned Japanese in Postwar Manchuria: The Lives of War Orphans and Wives in Two 
Countries, New York: Routledge 2011, p.22. For a more recent visit to the usually closed-off place, see Kazuhiko 
Makita: “Stroll through history: Japanese cemetery in China” (2015). Available online: https://www.asiaone.com/ 
asia/stroll-through-history-japanese-cemetery-china. 
18
 See Michael Meyer: In Manchuria: A Village Called Wasteland and the Transformation of Rural China, New 
York: Bloomsbury Press 2015, p. 190. 






 Since the role of the Japanese is seen from the Chinese side not as 
ambivalent as the Russian one, but as simply negative, searching for more information or 
remains would be even more challenging than with the Russians. It might be added that research 
about the Russian cemeteries was already hampered by a clear sense during fieldwork that such 
research was not going to be easy. Though the “real” staff of libraries or sites was always very 
kind and helpful, access to archives was barred, and even simple public library research was at 
times “surveyed” to a degree rare even for Chinese standards. Thus, this research turned out to be 






Today, Harbin’s cemetery landscape provides a quite unique feature: the large Huangshan 
cemetery (Huangshan gongmu 皇山公墓, formerly: Huangshan zuizi gongmu 荒山咀子公墓)20 
set up in the 1950s far to the east of the city, which nowadays hosts not only Chinese dead but 
also the largest Jewish cemetery in East Asia, a Christian orthodox one and one for Soviet 
“martyrs”. There were further sections designed for Muslims and other minorities as well, when 
the cemetery was set up. The Huangshan cemetery is thus a physical reminder of the multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural and multi-religious history of Harbin.  
 
Before we may look into the cemetery itself and its prehistory, the larger context should be 
sketched out: Harbin’s history since the late 19th century was closely connected to Russian 
railway construction efforts. Although the railway city of Harbin was founded as such in 1898 by 
Russians in an area where several small hamlets existed which mainly lived off the Sungari 
                                                          
19
 See the Xinhua report: “Monument for Japanese settlers removed in NE China”, August 7, 2011. Available online: 
http://en.people.cn/90883/7562153.html. 
20
 According to the manager of the cemetery in 2004, Li Fangbin 李芳斌, the cemetery was renamed from the not 
very positively connoted “mouth of the barren mountain” to the homophone “imperial mountain” in 1991. See Li 
Fangbin 李芳斌 : “Haerbin youtairen mudi de kaifang yu guanli” 哈尔滨犹太人墓地的开放与管理  (“The 
management of the Harbin Jewish Cemetery”) in the English-Chinese collection: Haerbin youtairen de guxiangqing 
哈尔滨犹太人的故乡情 (“Homesick feeling of Harbin Jews: a paper collection from the International Seminar on 
the History and Culture of Jews in Harbin, August 29 – September 2, 2004”), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin 
chubanshe 2005, pp.272-280. The internal publication of the Harbin Civil Policy Bureau on their dealings with 
funerary affairs: Haerbinshi minzhengju 哈尔滨市民政局: Haerbinshi binzang shiwu guanlisuo zhi 哈尔滨市殡葬
事务管理所志 (Gazetteer of the Harbin municipal funerary affairs administration), Harbin: Haerbinshi gonganju 
1999, p. 69, though, dates the renaming explicitly to 1995. (In 1991 publications, the old way of writing is in fact 
still used.) 




River (Songhua jiang 松花江), Chinese controversies about celebrating a centennial in 1998 
made clear that Chinese authorities still feel obliged to minimize the “Russian definition” of 
Harbin, pointing out that there were people (if not necessarily Han Chinese) living in the area 
before.
21
 Up to today, there is thus a typical wavering between nationalist sentiments on the one 
hand to claim Harbin as “Chinese”, and the recognition of touristic “branding” potential provided 
by the “foreign” aspects of the city on the other, making it hard to decide how to position today’s 
Harbin vis-à-vis its “multi-cultural” past.22 In any case, back in the late 19th century, the Qing 
government in Beijing had granted the construction of the so-called Chinese Eastern Railway 
(CER) by treaty to Russia in the hope to counter Japanese encroachment in Manchuria after the 
latter had won the Sino-Japanese War 1894/95. Thus, a secret alliance with Russia seemed to be 
an expedient means for blocking the Japanese. Architects of this alliance were Minister of 
Finance, Sergey Witte, on the Russian, and Li Hongzhang 李鸿章, the most influential official 
for foreign affairs in the late 19th century, on the Qing side. Russia, in turn, could link the CER 
up to its Trans-Siberian Railway, forming a “T” by linking to the East to Vladivostok in a direct 
line, West to Chita, and to the South through all of Manchuria to the ports of Dalian and Port 
Arthur (Lüshun). The zone close to the railway tracks was handed as a concession to the 
Russians, too, who nominally did not act on a governmental level but via a private enterprise 
which raised funds through the Russo-Chinese Bank founded in 1895. The Russians started 
railway construction and set up the nucleus of the railway city of Harbin at the central juncture of 
the “T” in 1898, with the railway starting operation in 1903 under the long-term manager (until 
1920) and “king of Harbin”, Dmitry Khorvat. 23  Though Harbin is today the capital of 
Heilongjiang 黑龙江 Province, the area south of the Sungari River where the city was located 
belonged at the time still to the province of Jilin 吉林.  
 
The first times for the new city were not easy, due to the Boxer Uprising which swept Northern 
China and parts of Manchuria, affecting also Harbin with a brief siege directly, and beyond this 
more indirectly, resulting in casualties above all in the year 1900. Thereafter the Russo-Japanese 
                                                          
21
 For the discussion on the “centennial”, see Thomas Lahusen: “A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a 
Centennial”. In: The China Quarterly, no. 154 (1998), June, p. 400-410. 
22
 A typical example of this wavering is Xue Lianju 薛连举: Haerbin de jinghua: duoyuan wenhua 哈尔滨的精华。
多元文化 (Harbin’s essence: its pluralistic culture), Harbin: Dongbei linye daxue chubanshe 2015. 
23
 A 1914 British consular report called Khorvat/Horvath (as he is often transcribed in Western sources) even as 
“king and god” of Harbin. See James H. Carter:  Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 
1916-1932, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 2002, p. 15. He at times also acted simultaneously as 
consul for the Russians. (See Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: Waishizhi 黑龙江省志。第六十九卷。外事
志 (Heilongjiang province gazetteer: no. 69: gazetteer of foreign affairs), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 
1993, pp. 93-94). For a monumental collection of photos on the history of the railway which also contains a few 
pictures regarding cemeteries, see the album put together from the Russian side about the period of construction 
(1897-1903) preserved in the provincial museum and translated into Chinese for the 110th anniversary of the 
railway opening: Pang Xuechen 庞学臣 (ed.): Zhongdong tielu dahuace 中东铁路大画册 (Big Album on the 
Chinese Eastern Railway), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2013. 




War of 1904/05 which to Russia meant the “loss” of rights in Southern Manchuria to the 
Japanese also left its mark on Harbin in the North, mostly by receiving wounded and dead. The 
periodic epidemics and plagues of the early years also cost many lives. Nevertheless, Harbin 
soon started to grow.
24
 Its foreign population was at first mostly hailing from the Russian Empire, 
but soon the city attracted also other Western nations, namely after the Russo-Japanese War and 
Harbin’s becoming a “treaty port” in 1907 which boosted the internationalization of the city.25 
Apart from Westerners, there were also many Japanese (including the sizable group of Japanese 
prostitutes present in the city).
26
 The Japanese on the one hand wanted to do business but also on 
the other saw Harbin as a strategic location for extending influence into the whole area of 
Manchuria.
27
 This population mix implied there were diverse creeds and ethnicities present. Still, 
Russian as a language and the Orthodox faith in terms of religion dominated. Since the place 
needed also local services and provided opportunities of trade, it also attracted more and more 
Chinese over time, usually from Northern Chinese provinces.
28
 Whereas the foreigners mainly 
settled in the strip of land close by the railway which functioned as a Russian concession, the 
Chinese mainly lived in the neighboring area called “Fujiadian” 傅家甸 (nowadays the Daowai 
道外 district of the city of Harbin).  
 
At first, the Russians had settled in “Old Harbin”, a part to the South of the present city center, 
since the area closer to the Sungari River was rather swampy. However, the place was soon 
found inconvenient and too far from the river, and thus, after draining the swamps, the railway 
station as the most important feature of the “Russian” city was placed somewhat more to the 
north, with “New Harbin” close-by. In between “New Harbin” and the Sungari the city 
developed further along the railway tracks.
29
 At the main junction close to the railway station the 
                                                          
24
 For Harbin in tsarist times, see David Wolff: To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian 
Manchuria, 1898-1914, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999. 
25
 For a brief characterization of the various consulates opened in Harbin, see the Heilongjiang province gazetteer 
volume on foreign affairs: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), pp. 91-117. 
26
 In fact, gender-sensitive population figures (usually excluding the military, though!) show that it was only in 1916 
that men were more numerous among the Japanese than women – a stark contrast to other nationalities. See, e.g., 
Xue Lianju 薛连举: Haerbin renkou bianqian 哈尔滨人口变迁 (The development of Harbin’s population), Harbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 1998, pp. 150-151. This was mainly due to prostitution. 
27
 For the early Japanese post-Russo-Japanese War designs for Manchuria, see, e.g., Matsusaka (2001).  
28
 On the Chinese migration to Manchuria from predominantly Shandong in the early 20th century, see Thomas R. 
Gottschang and Diana Lary: Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria, Ann 
Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan 2000. Shandong had been the main supply of Han-
Chinese settlers also at earlier times. It should be kept in mind that officially the Qing had allowed for Chinese 
settlement only in Southern Manchuria and had opened up the North of Manchuria, their “homeland”, only 
reluctantly and in piecemeal fashion in the late 19th century to counter foreign encroachment. 
29
 For a brief summary, see Carter (2001), p. 14-21. For some maps, see Ji Fenghui 纪凤辉: Haerbin xungen 哈尔滨
寻根 (Searching for the roots of Harbin), Harbin: Haerbin chubanshe 1996, pp. 58-67, notably starting in the 18th 
century insinuating, once more, that the “roots” of Harbin are pre-Russian. 




St. Nikolay Cathedral, built of wood in the Vologda style,
30
 marked the “heart” of Russian 
presence in the city, and from there the longest road of “New Harbin” extended towards the 
Northeast, lined with foreign consulates, various churches and – cemeteries. In 1913, when a first 
detailed census of Harbin’s CER zone was done, it counted nearly 70.000 people of 53 
nationalities with the most important languages spoken being Russian, Chinese, Polish and 
Yiddish.
31
 And in terms of religion, the Russian Orthodox who had been first administered by 
the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission of Beijing and since 1907 belonged to the newly established 
diocese of Vladivostok,
32
 were the major group,
33
 making up half of the total, followed by 
adherents of Chinese religions, the Jews and Catholics.
34
 In all, during the pre-Communist time, 
beyond the main group of Russian Orthodox, Harbin’s foreign population included groups of Old 
Believers, Molokans and Armenians in the larger Orthodox realm; Catholics (Roman and 
Eastern-rite Catholics); Adventists, Evangelical Christians, Lutherans, Baptists in the Protestant 
field; Jews and Karaites in the larger Jewish realm; Muslims; Japanese and Korean Christian and 
Buddhist groups; and adherents of the Japanese “new religion” Tenrikyô天理教.35 
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 Early photos can be found, e.g., on postcards. See Cao Zengshen 曹增伸: Lao feng jiu pian Haerbin 老封旧片哈
尔滨 (“Harbin in Old Envelopes and Cards”), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2008, pp. 97, 104, 153. See 
also the illustration sheets with further old photos until the church’s destruction in Ji Fenghui (1996). 
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 See, e.g., Olga Bakich: “Emigré Identity: The Case of Harbin”. In: The South Atlantic Quarterly no. 99:1 (2000), 
pp. 51-73, there p. 53. 
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 Nicholas II granted the diocese of Vladivostok in 1907. For an insider summary of the Russian Orthodox Church 
in China until the early 20th century, see the overview by the key figure in Beijing, Bishop (later Metropolitan) 
Innokenty (Figurovsky), in 1916: “The Russian Orthodox Mission in China”. In: The Chinese Recorder, October 1, 
1916, pp. 678-685. 
33
 Taken altogether, there was the impressive number of 21 Orthodox churches built in Harbin over time. For a map, 
see the Russian work of Kradin, focusing on architecture, translated into Chinese: N. P. Kelajin 克拉金: Haerbin: 
Eluosiren xinzhong de lixiang chengshi  哈尔滨。俄罗斯人心中的理想城市 (Harbin: ideal city in the minds of the 
Russians [note: the original title had „Harbin: Russian Atlantis“]), Harbin: Haerbin chubanshe 2007, p. 74. For short 
descriptions by a Harbin Russian émigré, see He Ying 贺颖 (ed.): Ta xiang yi guxiang: Eluosiren huiyi Haerbin 他
乡亦故乡。俄罗斯人回忆哈尔滨 (Foreign land and homeland: Russians remember Harbin), Harbin: Heilongjiang 
renmin chubanshe 2010, pp. 168-183. 
34
 Olga Bakich: “Russian Émigrés in Harbin’s Multinational Past: Censuses and Identity”. In: Dan Ben-Canaan, 
Frank Grüner, Ines Prodöhl (eds.): Entangled Histories: the Transcultural Past of Northeast China, Cham: Springer 
2014, pp. 83-99, there p. 87. For a Chinese description of the various faith groups present among the foreigners, see 
the Heilongjiang province gazetteer volume on foreign affairs: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi 
(1993), pp. 142-156. It also argues that in terms of Christians, the foreign and the Chinese Christians only rarely 
interacted (p. 143). It should, however, be borne in mind that the railway zone and the missions among Chinese 
beyond the zone were administratively separate.   
35
 Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), pp. 146-151. (A similar description can be found in the 
later Harbin-specific gazetteer on foreign affairs. See also the later Harbin-specific gazetteer on religion of 1998, 
which is subsequent but gives more details for the situation in Harbin beyond the railway zone:  Haerbinshi 
difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 哈尔滨市地方志边缘委员会: Haerbin shizhi: zongjiao, fangyan 哈尔滨市志。宗
教，方言 (Harbin municipal gazetteer. Religion, Local Languages), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 1998.) 
For a description with many photos, see also Xue Lianju (2015), chapter 3. 




When the Romanovs were dethroned in 1917 and Civil War in Russia ensued, Harbin with its 
“tsarist” Russian population was directly affected and remained an important center for the 
“Whites” who held out the longest in Siberia and the Far East,36 and after the final defeat often 
took refuge in Harbin. Thus, the “typical” foreign sojourner in Harbin at that time was either a 
merchant or an émigré, and the Russian Civil War made for a huge influx of (often elite) 
refugees.  
 
The whole city, including its “Chinese” parts, became even more integrated into one city when 
the Chinese did not recognize the privileges contracted with the tsarist government any longer 
after the October Revolution and Civil War, thus turning Harbin during the 1920s into a more 
and more “Chinese” city, 37 if with a substantial (and ever shifting) foreign population. By now, 
the “old Harbiners”, i.e. those “Russians” who had come with the CER, including a substantial 
number of Russian Jews, but also Polish, Ukrainians etc., were joined by new waves of émigrés, 
mainly made up of “White” Russians who fled the Bolsheviks.38 The Beijing government which 
had first placed its bet on the “Whites”, by 1924 finally signed an accord with Moscow, 
diplomatically recognizing the Soviet Union, and thus the Russians in Harbin had to decide 
whether to align themselves with the “Soviets”, become “Chinese” or remain “stateless”, which 
often implied no access to all “Russian” institutions now taken over by the Soviets. For those not 
able or willing to emigrate further, this meant often a higher risk of poverty,
39
 and in fact also 
with burials the number of “stateless” in the “Russian” “pauper cemetery” which had to be set up 
in the 1930s was substantial. After the 1924 accord between the Beijing government and the 
Soviets who declared their readiness to forego several of the former tsarist privileges, the CER 
and the former CER zone were co-administered, which meant that jobs were now only for those 
either “Soviet” or “Chinese” (and all others dismissed). However, Sino-Soviet relations became 
more complicated after 1927 with a more assertive Chinese nationalism, the break-up of the 
United Front in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, and the power struggle in 
Moscow which removed the last obstacles to Stalin’s supremacy. In 1929, a major clash occurred 
between the Soviets and the Chinese over the railway rights,
40
 and after Japan’s invasion into 
Manchuria of 1931 and the subsequent establishment of the “puppet state” Manchukuo, the 
Soviet Union sold its railway rights to Japan in 1935, thus effectively ending Russian 
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 For a critical view on the “White” warlords in the Far East, some of whom ended up in Harbin, see Jamie Bisher: 
White Terror: Cossack Warlords of the Trans-Siberian, London and New York: Routledge 2005. 
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 For this, see, e.g., Carter (2001). 
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 Bakich (2000), p. 56. A further wave of immigrants mentioned by the Chinese are the Kulaks who fled 
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shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), p. 124. 
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prerogatives but strengthening the Japanese, much to the chagrin of the Chinese who had not 
been informed of the deal beforehand. 
 
For the foreign sojourners in Harbin, this was another period when many tried to leave, 
especially if they had opted for Soviet citizenship in the meantime which was now not opportune 
any longer in the Japanese-Manchukuo regime. The Japanese, on their side, were ambivalent 
towards the Russians and other foreigners, seeing them either as potential Soviet spies or as 
potential allies, if “right-wing” and anti-Bolshevist. 41  After Pearl Harbor, the foreigners in 
Harbin from countries now officially at war with Japan were interned and expulsed. Only the 
ones from “befriended nations” (Germany, Italy, “Vichy France”) kept their consulates running, 
and the many “stateless”, often former Russian “White” elites, including aristocrats or military 
leaders, and a sizable group of Jews, if they had not moved on to Shanghai, Hong Kong or 
overseas before, remained too. Many Russian Jews, in fact, had switched between a “Russian”, 
“Soviet” or “stateless” identity which made their group particularly hard to grasp from a Chinese 
point of view after the war and the founding of Israel to where they are nowadays foremost 
connected in Chinese minds.
 42
 All those remaining during WW II faced again a problem when 
the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and marched into Manchuria in 1945 to force the 
Japanese-Manchukuo surrender. At this time, the Soviets also captured some of their one-time 
“White” enemies with predictable outcome. Locally, they made for a rather smooth transition of 
the city into Chinese Communist hands. Thus, during the Chinese Civil War, Harbin was 
basically already a Communist-directed city well before the PRC was officially established in 
Beijing in 1949 and thus was spared large-scale military confrontations devastating other parts of 
Manchuria. This, again, made Harbin somewhat special, since Manchuria was one of the key 
areas where the Civil War and therewith the future of China was decided, but locally experiences 
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 Bakich (2000), p. 61-64. For the right-wing, see, e.g., Susanne Hohler: Fascism in Manchuria: The Soviet-China 
Encounter in the 1930s, London and New York: I.B. Tauris 2017. 
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 Cf. Zhao Xigang 赵喜罡: “Haerbin de youtairen” 哈尔滨的犹太人 (Harbin’s Jews). In: Haerbin wenshi ziliao 哈
尔滨文史资料 (Materials on history and culture of Harbin) no. 19, 1995, pp. 267-274, there p. 267. See also the 
provincial gazetteer on “population”: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di wushiqi juan: renkouzhi 黑龙江省志。第五十七卷。
人口志 (Heilongjiang provincial gazetteer no. 57: population gazetteer), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 
1996, which has difficulties to statistically group the Jews. One may further note that it was above all the Japanese 
who had kept statistics of the foreign population already before their occupation of Manchuria: cf. Xue Lianju 
(1998), pp. 137-142, who bases himself on Japanese yearly statistics kept since 1916. Notably, the Japanese – in 
spite of having recognized the Soviets officially since 1925 – switched the category of “Russian” to “Soviet” only as 
late as 1927! (See there statistics on p. 137).  
43
 More generally on Manchuria in the Civil War, see Steven I. Levine: Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution 
in Manchuria, 1945-1948, New York: Columbia University Press 1987. 




The “political problem” of many Russians who had remained up to 1945, however, not only 
concerned the living, but also the dead and their memorialization. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets 
showed only interest in protecting tombs of “their own people” in Harbin subsequently, and thus 
it was with the Soviet Consulate’s approval that the Chinese PRC authorities used the area where 
many foreigners had been buried, levelling most tombs in that area, to build the present-day 
“Culture Park” there in the 1950s, as long as the “Soviet Martyrs’ tombs” were preserved. 
 
In fact, turning to the problem of cemeteries, the multi-cultural and multi-religious history of 
Harbin had consequences well beyond life. When it came to death, religion became a very 
important issue, and thus cemeteries had been set up for different creeds.
44
 Unsurprisingly, the 
Russian Orthodox were the first, but also many Russian Jews lived in Harbin who soon had their 
own cemetery adjacent to the Orthodox one. When the foreign community became ever more 
pluralized, further ones were set up for Catholics (e.g. Poles, but also some Italians, Spaniards, 
French or Portuguese) and Protestants (e.g. Germans, Estonians, Latvians, British, Americans, 
Canadians, Danes, Dutch etc.),
45
 Muslims and others.
46
 Basically, before the founding of the 
PRC, the Orthodox had two large cemeteries: the “old” one close to the city center at the so-
called Ukrainian Church which basically stopped new interment in 1927,
47
 and the “new” one, 
founded not much later than the “old” one, further up the main Northeast axis at today’s “Culture 
Park”. The Jews had theirs set up adjacent to the Orthodox ones, with the old one obviously 
shifted to the new location at the present-day “Culture Park” to be thereafter the only Jewish 
one,
48
 and the other Western nations had a “united” one, also called “7-countries graveyard” 
(which then was turned into a 6-country one when the Poles set up their own) (for more details 
see below).
49
 Those were all basically in the wider area of today’s “Culture Park”. After 1945 the 
Soviet “martyrs” who died combating the Japanese in the last days of WW II were buried in the 
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 Cf. Elena Chernolutskaya: “Religious Communities in Harbin and Ethnic Identity of Russian Émigrés”. In: The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no. 1, 2000, pp. 79-96. 
45
 “Protestant” denominations of locally notable size included Lutherans, but also Baptists and Adventists, 
Evangelical Christians, Presbyterians and Methodists. 
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(History of Russian émigrés in Harbin), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2003, pp. 443-449. See also there 
pp. 478-479 for a table of religious activities centers of the non-Orthodox “Russians”. This book provides also some 
very interesting glimpses into individual cases from archival files obviously created after WW II (pp. 449-469). 
47
 Cf. Kelajin (Kradin) (2007), p. 118 and p. 120. For the church, see below. 
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considering the cemetery most, in various publications. See, e.g., the latest version in 2017: Zhang Tiejiang 张铁江: 
Zhongguo dongbei youtairen yanjiu 中国东北犹太人研究  (Study on the Jews in Northeast China), Harbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2017, p. 274-275. 
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 Apart from the fact that the Poles had their own “country” only again in 1918, it seems that the naming of the 
cemetery as “seven countries” was prevalent only in Chinese: rather, the differentiation was according to faith. Thus, 
often the naming of “united” cemetery appears, too (see below). Cf. also the Foreign Affairs volume of the 
Heilongjiang Provincial gazetteer: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), p. 186. 




“Culture Park” area as well, together with Soviet advisors of the early days of PRC times. 
However, these “good” Soviet brothers were spatially distinguished from the pre-PRC 
“problematic” ones associated with Russian imperialism or “White” Russians hostile to 
Communism who had fled before the Bolsheviks to Harbin in pre-PRC times. 
 
When the Harbin municipality wanted to develop the by now inner-city area of today’s “Culture 
Park” in the 1950s, the question arose as to what to do with all those tombs. The solution was to 
set up a new cemetery way out of the city to the East, the Huangshan cemetery, and offer to 
transfer those tombs who still had people to care for (and pay for the transfer). Only the “friendly” 
Soviet “martyrs” were exempted who would remain at the “Culture Park” location until 2007 
when they, too, were shifted to the Huangshan cemetery. Notably, although that 2007 transfer to 
Huangshan and the Sino-Russian opening ceremony is detailed on the on-spot plaque and was 
reported in the Russian press, the local Chinese press did not even mention it
50
 – a proof of the 
fact that China’s diplomatic actions are careful in considering target groups in terms of an 
international “cooperative” appearance, while keeping silent to the Chinese audience at home. At 
the Huangshan cemetery, then, those Westerners’ tombs transferred in the late 1950s were 
basically divided between two sections: the Jews went to the Jewish section, the Orthodox (and 
some others) to the Orthodox section. And the later transferred Soviet “martyrs” make up a third 
section. 
 
In 1973 at a time when the Foreign Ministry in Beijing asked for all places in China to check for 
the status of foreigners’ tombs,51 a first attempt to repair the broken steles in the foreigners’ 
sections of the Huangshan cemetery was undertaken, and in 1977 an official proclamation argued 
for the preservation of foreigners’ tombs. Some “irregular” Chinese interments were removed.52 
In 1987 and 1990 further repairs were undertaken, and in the 1990s, i.e. in the context of the 
warming of ties between Israel and the PRC in 1992 on the one hand and a new relationship with 
post-Soviet Russia on the other, the whole place was renamed, as mentioned, by choosing more 
“positive” characters for “Huangshan”: 皇山 (imperial mountain).53 Subsequently, the destroyed 
chapel in the orthodox section, the wood of which had been used by locals during the Cultural 
Revolution, was rebuilt in 1995 (though as of now not usually open but for special services),
54
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 The local daily, Haerbin Ribao 哈尔滨日报 (Harbin Daily) notably did not mention the transfer and the opening 
ceremony in the presence of the Foreign Secretaries of China and Russia, though reporting that Russian Foreign 
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 See Müller (2018a), p. 19-20. 
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 This could mean that since only the foreigners’ and Muslim sections were officially still open for earth burials, 
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 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 69. 
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 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 173. It should be also mentioned that the 1960s to early 1970s were apparently 
hard times for Harbin’s population not only because of the Cultural Revolution, but also because of the preceding 




and the Jews were provided with a new building for ritual washing etc. before burial as well. 
And this “care” of Harbin for the two main groups of foreigners, the Russians (subdivided into 
the Orthodox and the Soviets) and the (de facto mostly Russian) Jews, is very much used today 




Given this general picture, the following now tries to unravel the history behind the present 
situation. Since the local archives (Harbin City Archives and Heilongjiang Provincial Archives) 
were barring foreigners at the time of research, a reconstruction of what exactly happened with 
Russian (foreigners’) tombs in Harbin needs to use circumstantial evidence. Still, from what is 
available,
 56
 a rough picture can be pieced together. This will be done in several steps: first 
looking at the pre-PRC history of burials, then at the transfer, and finally at the present situation 
with the different groups: Orthodox, Jewish and “Soviet”. 
 
In pre-PRC times, the largest group of foreign burials in Harbin clearly was the Orthodox. With 
the advent of the Russians in the area, the necessity to provide a burial space for them arose, and 
thus already in 1898 a first Russian cemetery in “Old Harbin” was set up of which, however, no 
traces remain.
57
 In 1899, the “old Orthodox cemetery” was set up at the main road leading to the 
Northeast, though the present church (the “Ukrainian church”, functioning as the only active 
Orthodox church today) was built as a funeral church only in 1930.
58
 Given the high numbers of 
Ukrainians, it was mainly set up for them, since there were other churches for Russians already 
in place in Harbin. The tiny roped-off memorial building still preserved close by the church [ill. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
famine in the wake of the Great Leap Forward policies which, taken together, led to a notable ebb in population 
figures over that time, bespeaking the difficulties. (See Heilongjiang shengzhi: di wushiqi juan: renkouzhi (1996), p. 
49.) 
55
 A similar development has been found in the case of Guangzhou and Shanghai. See Müller (2018a). As stated 
before, the Jews are categorized as an own “nationality” by the Chinese. 
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 As far as the Chinese side is concerned, one may note the strong influence of the local gazetteer historiography of 
the 1980s and 1990s on most later Chinese publications (not the least because archival access has been restricted at 
times even for Chinese researchers). For the context and main thrust of that decisive historiographical enterprise 
(being part of a nation-wide call for continuing the old gazetteer tradition), see Søren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen: 
The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 1995, esp. chapter 5. 
Some gazetteers claim to cite archival sources, others don’t explicitly, while some Chinese researchers since the 
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 See, e.g., Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 65. This source (cf. above note 20) is the most specified one on the 
topic of funerary affairs although at closer scrutiny it reveals various notable omissions and some contradictions. It 
has therefore to be used in tandem with other sources to counter-check. Notably, also this source insists that the area 
was “Chinese” before the advent of the Russians, and thus the Chinese “Wang clan graveyard” (Wang jia yidi 王家
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1] was part of the “old” cemetery and dedicated to the fallen in the Boxer Uprising – a fact 
present-day Chinese sources usually avoid to mention.
59
 Before the “Ukrainian church” was built 
adjacent to the cemetery, the St. Nikolay Cathedral (built in 1899 and consecrated in 1900) at the 
crucial central road junction of “New” Harbin from where the main roads started, had been 
responsible for this “old” cemetery which by 1936 was said to host roughly 1.000 tombs.60 
Harbin, which served as the center of Russian émigré life in Northeastern China, was raised to 
the status of diocese in 1922, emancipating her officially from Vladivostok after the latter had 
“fallen to the Reds”. This was done by the by-now Serbia-based “Russian Orthodox Church 
Outside Russia” (ROCOR), 61  to which Harbin aligned, appointing Methodius/Mefody 
(Gerasimov) as the first archbishop (and later metropolitan) of Harbin. He and some other clergy, 
though, were buried on the Cathedral’s grounds, not in the “old” cemetery which by then, as 
stated, had the “Ukrainian church” as a funeral church, by this relieving the Cathedral from this 
duty. The burial of the archbishop and metropolitan on the Cathedral’s ground, in turn, 
strengthened the symbolic central function of St. Nikolay for the Orthodox. 
 
Here, it should be added that the St. Nikolay Cathedral at the very heart of the railway city was 
the religiously paramount orthodox church in Harbin throughout and remained in place until the 
Cultural Revolution when it was torn down as a key symbol of “imperialism” – an act that has 
become iconic for Red Guard destruction. Photos taken at the occasion by a local journalist who 
attended a reception of a delegation from Albania in a building opposite the Cathedral, were 
published years later in the post-Cultural Revolution “old photos” collection project intended to 
gather “history from below”, making the case famous nation-wide. 62  As became clear, 
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 Most Chinese sources tend to tellingly skip this eye-catching small building or to label it only vaguely as a 
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photos which appeared in Germany soon after the destruction of the St. Nikolay Cathedral (which also included 
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destruction was not wanton, but fairly systematic, not the least to avoid accidents when 
dismantling the church. Ideologically, the aim was to reclaim the city’s perceived foreign “center” 
with a Chinese “revolutionary stele” erected instead (which – irony of history – later was 
dismantled, too, when Cultural Revolution champion Lin Biao’s 林彪  faction went out of 
favor).
63
 The place of the former Cathedral which had been nicknamed by the Chinese in pre-
PRC times “Lama dais” (lamatai 喇嘛台),64  tells of its politicized past by being today forcefully 
“de-politicized” and turned into a mere traffic circle. However, in view of the particular 
historical importance of the St. Nikolay Cathedral, the church was recently rebuilt with much 
attention to architectural detail outside the city, but in a tellingly commercialized surrounding 
(and – needless to say – without any religious function):65 the pricy Russian theme park “Volga 
Manor” (Fuerjia zhuangyuan 伏尔加庄园)!66 
 
Furthermore, in the context of burials and the St. Nikolay Cathedral, one should also point out 
that it had been put to instrumental use in this regard during Manchukuo times: it was the 
Japanese who ordered the contested “political” burial of a non-cleric young Orthodox Russian, 
the émigré minor officer Natarov. He had fallen for the Manchukuo/Japanese side in the armed 
conflict with the Soviets at Nomonhan in 1939, a conflict provoked by the Japanese Kwantung 
(Guandong/Kantô) Army (without authorization from Tokyo).
67
 Although – or maybe just 
because – the Nomonhan adventure went wrong for the Kwantung Army,68 Natarov was buried 
with great fanfare upon the wish of the Manchukuo/Japanese authorities on the Cathedral’s 
grounds as a hero fighting “against the Comintern” in the showcased presence of all higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
chinesischen Kirche im Fernen Osten“ (The history of suffering of the Orthodox Russian and Chinese Church in the 
Far East). In: Der christliche Osten (The Christian East) 1967, no. 1, pp. 178-185. 
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 For the metamorphoses of this nodal point in the city, see Liu Yannian 刘延年: Haerbin jiyi 哈尔滨记忆 
(“Memory of Harbin”), Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe 2016, pp. 437-442.  
64
 The folk appellation of orthodox priests as “lamas” bespeaks, needless to say, the influence of Buddhism. 
65
 For one of the few Chinese more sensitive evaluations of such ways of “treating” Russian tangible cultural 
heritage, see Rong Jie 荣洁 et al.: Eqiao yu Heilongjiang wenhua: Eluosi qiaomin dui Haerbin de yingxiang 俄侨与
黑龙江文化。俄罗斯侨民对哈尔滨的影响 (Russian émigrés and Heilongjiang culture. The influence of Russian 
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管理站 (ed.): Haerbin wenwu tuzhi 哈尔滨文物图志 (Illustrated gazetteer of Harbin cultural relics), Harbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2013. 
66
 For a remarkable TV documentary which narrates the story of the cathedral, its destruction and “resurrection” in 
Volga Manor by a Shanghainese investor as a “happy end”, see the 2010 CCTV 4 program in two installments: 
Xiaoshi de jianzhu. Sheng Nigula jiaotang chuanqi  消失的建筑. 圣尼古拉大教堂传奇 (Vanished architecture. The 
legendary story of the St. Nikolay church). Here the two local journalist witnesses of 1966 are also interviewed. 
Available online: http://tv.cctv.com/2012/12/15/VIDE1355516939309757.shtml and http://tv.cctv.com/2012/12/15/ 
VIDE1355516938525748.shtml. 
67
 On this border conflict, see Stuart Goldman: Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War 
II, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2012. 
68
 Although casualties on the Soviet side were higher, they won the contest, and Tokyo (displeased by the Kwantung 
Army’s unauthorized actions already) asked for peace again. 




Orthodox clergy of Harbin.
69
 Subsequently, a large monument was added in 1941 at the 
Cathedral Square for all the fallen “fighters against Communism” which was inaugurated again 
in the presence of all the important Orthodox clergy of Harbin who still agreed to cooperate with 
the authorities at this point.
70
 (The cooperation only ran into a severe crisis when the Japanese 
wanted the Orthodox to conform to State Shintô rituals which crossed the red line.) When the 
Soviets entered Harbin in 1945, they blew up the tomb of Natarov, razed the monument and 
erected a monument for those comrades who had died during the “August Storm” instead.71 This 
all shows the high symbolic value of the Cathedral’s square and burials there, but also that this 
central identifying space had been wrought from the Orthodox in signification. 
 
Apart from the Cathedral, another early small Russian burial place was connected to the Amur 
Army with its own church dedicated to the Iveron icon,
72
 just north of the railway station, built in 
1907 and dedicated in 1908. It was the place to collectively commemorate the fallen soldiers, 
above all in the Russo-Japanese war which waged, however, further south in Manchuria. Since it 
is connected explicitly to the Russian tsarist military, its conservation is especially controversial 
among the population of Harbin to this day.
73
 This came into new focus with the issue of the 
tomb of the Russian imperial officer and anti-Bolshevik Vladimir Kappel who died of frostbite 
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 For this instrumental use of the Orthodox Church by the Japanese which was highly disputed among the Orthodox, 
see Ilya Kharin: After Nicholas: Self-Realization of the Japanese Orthodox Church 1912-1956, Gloucester: Wide 
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(2019), p. 148. 
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 In fact, there were even two churches in Harbin (and one chapel) dedicated to the Iveron icon (which was said to 
have shown its protective forces during Napoleon’s attack on Moscow). The Russian émigrés in Harbin took 
apparently great pride in preserving Russian traditions under attack at the time in the Soviet Union. See Kelajin 
(Kradin) (2007), p. 87. Some of the buried and/or commemorated soldiers had been transported there from Lüshun 
during the Russo-Japanese War, and list of names were put up on the walls. See the description by a Russian émigré 
cited in He Ying (2010), p. 176.  
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 The church, heavily damaged in August 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, was put on the agenda for repair in 
2004. (“Harbin to rebuild Orthodox church”, 2004, December 10. Available online: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
english/doc/2004-12/10/content_399092.htm). In 2017, the local government had announced a new restoration plan. 
See Wang Zhijun 王志军 and Shi Shu 史书: “Haerbin Sheng Yiweier jiaotang lishi gouchen” 哈尔滨圣伊维尔教堂
历史钩沉 (Historical hook of the Holy Iveron Church in Harbin). In: Xiboliya yanjiu 西伯利亚研究 (“Siberian 
Studies”) vol. 45, no. 4, August 2018, pp. 89-92. The restoration project was sustained also by Russians. See Sergey 
Eryomin: “Iversky chram v Kharbine” (The Iveron Church in Harbin), February 6, 2017. Available online:  
http://www.unification.com.au/articles/3627/. The church is visible from the train station and is now seen with its re-
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and on-the-road amputation in 1920 on the famous Great Siberian Ice March after the fall of the 
Siberian “White” regime of Admiral Kolchak on retreat with his last forces (the “kappelevtsy”). 
Fearing the advancing Bolsheviks who were on record to desecrate tombs of their political 
enemies (and thus were also providing a Soviet example to PRC practices),
74
 the “Whites” dug 
out the already buried Kappel again and transported his coffin to Harbin where they reburied him 
in the grounds of the Iveron church.
75
 In the context of increasing reappraisal of the “White” 
generals in Russia in the 2000s, his remains have been claimed by Russian activists and 
transferred back in late 2006 to bury Kappel with all honors in early 2007 in Moscow aside other 
“White” leaders,76  whereas in Harbin the topic was not mentioned any further. The tomb in 
Harbin had been controversial anyway, and in the 1950s it was already desecrated with the 




While the Iveron church with its high visibility due to the location near the railway station is thus 
a complicated case, one might note that today the most advertised church of Harbin is the St. 
Sophia church, which is architectonically speaking lavish, but as a “major historical and cultural 
site protected at the national level” now does not serve for religious purposes, but as a museum 
of Harbin’s architectural history. It, however, de facto was also the burial place of its designers.78 
 
The main Russian orthodox burial ground in Harbin, however, was clearly the “new Orthodox 
cemetery” which was set up already in 1902 in the area of today’s “Culture Park”,79 i.e. further 
up Northeast on the main Northeastern axis where the “old” one was situated as well, since the 
rising death rate required more burial space. This development was partly due to diseases and 
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ru/article/?id=867. For a short Chinese summary, see Liu Yannian (2016), pp. 208-211. 
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 For an account by a member of the finding commission in 2006, Irina Chudnova, about the exhumation process 
with Russian media coverage, see http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/harbin/20061222kappel_en.htm. 
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 On the different “versions” of the St. Sophia church through history and its architects, see, e.g., Kelajin (Kradin), 
pp. 90-101. For the architects buried there in 1932, see the description by a Russian émigré cited in He Ying (2010), 
p. 173. 
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 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 66. For a photo of 1930, see, e.g., Cao Zengshen (2008), p. 156. Ji Fenghui 
(1996), p. 201, dates the photo to 1930. 




periodic epidemics which at times even necessitated extra plague cemeteries,
80
 but also because 
of armed conflicts, from the Boxer Uprising (1900/01) which led to a lot of violence from all 
sides, with Russian victims often being transported to Harbin, to the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904/05), since Harbin had the best medical facilities (and at times could organize a transfer via 
the railway back to Russia). The use of the more inner-city “old cemetery”, thus, was 
increasingly reserved for more special cases, while the usual one was now to be the “new” 
cemetery. As mentioned, a 1936 survey counted around 1.000 burials in the “old” one, but the 
“new Orthodox cemetery” hosted the impressive number of over 23.000 tombs by then. The 
Jews, mostly from the Russian empire, had their own cemetery, first in an angle of the “old” and 
then aside the “new” Russian orthodox one, and the Japanese since 1912 and the Koreans since 
1917 also had their own cemeteries, all in the area close by the present “Culture Park”. And 
finally a further Russian “pauper” cemetery was set up in 1936 close to the Confucius Temple, 
where many of the “White Russians” and others now “stateless” were buried.81 Beyond the walls 
of the Jewish cemetery, the Karaites, a Jewish group not recognized by most other Jews, had 
their own burial ground as part of the “united” one.82  After the area of Harbin had been basically 
secured by the Chinese Communists in 1946 with the help of the Soviets who had slowed down 
military retreat after their victory over the Japanese in 1945 to give an advantage to the CCP, and 
thus well before the official founding of the PRC in 1949, the new local Hygiene Department 
made a survey in 1948, stating that in terms of foreigners’ tombs there were 37.000 “Russian” 
(obviously intending Orthodox) ones, 2.270 Jewish, and 2.266 in the one-time “7-countries 
graveyard” left over.83 
 
The latter “7-countries graveyard”, in turn, had been set up even earlier than the “new Orthodox” 
one, namely in 1900 (close to the present-day “Culture Park” area as well and thus, as it seems, 
leading the way to turn that whole area into use for cemeteries).
84
 According to the statistics, the 
“7 countries” intended the Czechs, Germans, French, Americans, British, Polish and Italians 
(until the Polish separated theirs from the then “6-countries cemetery”). 85  However, this 
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 There has been at least one extra plague cemetery in Harbin since remnants have been found on the grounds of the 
University of Engineering. (See “Gongcheng daxue yuannei faxian shuyi siwangzhe ‘hetongbei’” 工程大学院内发
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 See Zhang Tiejiang (2017), p. 275. By the way, according to Wang Zhijun (2011), p. 118, no Karaite was 
transferred to the Huangshan Cemetery in 1958. 
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85
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appellation as “7-countries graveyard” taken over from Manchukuo times hardly reflected the 
cemetery’s nature at its beginning, since e.g. the Polish were at the time still “Russian” subjects. 
In fact, other sources, call it a “united cemetery”. This is at times termed as “Catholic united” or 
“Christian/Protestant united” in Chinese, but there were obviously also cemetery sections for the 
non-Christian Jewish Karaites,
86
 and the Muslim Tartars who actually belonged to the category 
of “Russians” as well. Thus, although the Manchukuo-Japanese as well as the Chinese 
administrations tried to frame it along nationality, the real issue was religion. As one source 
suggests, it might have been the Catholics to first set up a cemetery which then was “enlarged” 
with further sections.
87
 This is highly plausible, given the fact that there were several Catholic 
Poles (at the time tsarist subjects) working for the railway from the start who would have 
required a consecrated burial space of their own. Either way, this suggests the cemetery was a 
combination of various subsections, given the different creeds represented, which prevailed over 
the “nationality factor”, and assembled all those not Orthodox and not (mainstream) Jewish 
among the non-Asian foreigners in “faith-specific” sections.88 Of all these, the Catholics (Roman 
Catholic and Eastern-rite Catholic) were reported to have had an own Russian-speaking keeper 
as long as up to the transfer of 1958.
89
 Since the Chinese gazetteers usually mention only the 
Orthodox, Jewish and Catholic cemeteries as still somehow functioning at the time of transfer in 
1958, one may infer that the Catholic one which mainly was for the Poles owed this to the fact 
that Poles (like the “Russians”, including the Russian Jews) were counting as “socialist brothers”. 
It might be also noted that the “Eastern-rite Catholics”, often from Lithuania or Belarus, had 
close connections to the Russian Orthodox in Harbin throughout. The Chinese Catholics, though, 
at the time were already massively under pressure in the context of the split between the Vatican-
loyal “underground Catholics” and the official “patriotic Catholics”. And one should briefly 
recall that in Manchuria there had not been only foreign missionaries from Western countries, 
but also quite a few Koreans acting as clergy. 
 
To add to the picture of cemeteries in Harbin in pre-PRC times, it should be at least briefly 
mentioned that the Chinese who had flocked to the growing “railway city” of Harbin in 
increasing numbers, of course also had their cemeteries: either set up by clans, or – more often – 
by native place organizations, since many Chinese hailed from either Shandong, Hunan and 
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Hubei, or Hebei and Shanxi.
90
 They, too, located their cemeteries increasingly to the East of the 
city. There was even a separate Catholic one since 1911 in the Chinese area of the city, and a 
protestant one since 1921.
91
 It should be noted that, administratively speaking, the railway 
concession zone, as long as it existed, was separate from the outside. This means, e.g., that the 
Catholics in the concession zone were looked after by usually Polish priests, while the Chinese 
Catholics (and those Catholic foreigners living outside the concession zone) were mostly looked 
after by French ones.
92
 The biggest Chinese cemetery (and most “upper class”), though, was the 
one of the Buddhist Jilesi 极乐寺 Temple, neighboring today’s “Culture Park”, and there was 
also a Chinese “pauper” cemetery close to the “stateless” one in the Confucius Temple area.93 In 
fact, the construction of the Jilesi and the Confucius Temple were seen by the Chinese in the city 
as a way to counter the “Russian Harbin” with a more and more “Chinese Harbin”.94 And thus 
the Chinese cemeteries close by laid their own spatial claim to the city’s “deathscape”. In sum, 
the East of the city became the “favorite” place for setting up cemeteries, and at the time of the 





Moving now into PRC times and the issue of transfer, it should be recalled that by 1953, at a 
time when the Korean War which affected also neighboring Manchuria, ended, most foreigners 
had been forced to leave China, especially the “capitalist” ones of Western countries or Christian 
missionaries. The Korean War had been accompanied by a wave of anti-Western (mainly anti-
US) propaganda in China herself, insinuating that Westerners (and missionaries in particular) 
were potential spies and should leave (sometimes after imprisonment). Some Chinese Protestants 
in Harbin (which had already been “united” from various denominations on government orders 
at this time), on the other hand, even were said to have donated weapons as a “positive” response 
to the “help Korea, resist the US” campaign in late 1950, proving their loyalty to the new state.96 
In short, by the mid-1950s the number of foreigners living in Harbin was limited to mostly those 
of “socialist brother countries”. Furthermore, with peace finally reigning, city development 
became a priority. Thus, the municipality of Harbin decided to set up a new cemetery called 
Huangshan 荒山 (lit.: barren mountain) to the far East of the city, intending to transfer (or else: 
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level) all inner-city tombs, basically aiming at using the space for parks – as was the practice also 
elsewhere in China. First, the Chinese cemeteries had been closed one after the other, but then 
also the many foreigners’ tombs had to be “dealt with” finally in 1958.  
 
Another notable development in 1958 with regard to burials was the municipal authorities’ 
decision to set up a “Revolutionary Cemetery” which would include those Chinese who died for 
the Communist “cause” (the “Martyrs”), but also “old cadres” and “revolutionary soldiers”, 
placed at first to the Southeast of the city.
97
 This, too, was decided to be moved later in 1983 to 
the vicinity of the Huangshan area, though remaining a separate entity. The “Revolutionary 
Cemetery” notably came to host also some casualties of the Cultural Revolution.98 The “Soviet 
Martyrs”, however, remained in the inner-city “Culture Park” area until 2007 and thus were not 
integrated with the Chinese “martyrs”. This shows that the fact that they were foreigners was 
more important than “the cause” for which they had died. It also suggests the Chinese authorities 
were careful when it came to foreign relations implications. In 1966 with the Cultural Revolution 
and the general push for cremation (and assault on “feudal superstition” in burial practices which 
had started in the 1950s but now was enforced), interments but for foreigners and Muslims was 
officially stopped altogether.
99
 And later in 1974, even those already buried (but for the 




Back in 1958 at the time of the Great Leap Forward and its revolutionary pitch when cities were 
supposed to show how they complied with “positive” targets and eliminated certain “negative” 
things like inner-city cemeteries,
101
 all interments not in the two big cemeteries far outside the 
City (Huangshan to the East and Jinshanbao 金山堡 to the West) had to be stopped,102 and in the 
Huangshan cemetery a zoning plan reserved an extra space for the foreigners, subdivided 
between “emigrants” of Russia (and further nations), and the Jews (who were to a substantial 
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part Russian). As mentioned before, also the Koreans were given a section,
103
 as were the 
Muslims,
104
 Catholics and Protestants.
105
 Also the minorities, i.e. the Manchus, Mongols etc. 




This zoning strategy shows a strange mixture of criteria to subdivide between religious affiliation 
and ethnicity (with apparently the goal in mind to put those together of whom a similar burial 
custom could be assumed). In fact it seems the responsible group for the transfer from Harbin’s 
Nangang 南岗 district from where all those foreigners’ tombs were moved, was puzzled about 
the faith-specific burials crisscrossing nationalities and asked for advice from a Soviet 
professor.
107
 Probably due to the influence of the Soviets, the local Orthodox Church, which had 
become “autonomous” in 1956 on Chinese government directives with the formal approval of 
the Moscow patriarchate, was at this point in time still allowed to construct a wooden chapel in 
the Huangshan cemetery’s respective “emigrants” (mainly Orthodox) section.108 This would be 
destroyed in 1966 with the Cultural Revolution (as were most tomb steles),
109
 and only replaced 
with a new one in 1995. It was also seemingly due to Soviet interference that collective 
memorials put up for the Russo-Japanese War dead in the former inner-city cemeteries, basically 
an anathema for the Chinese who judged this war as “imperialist” from both sides, were 
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collective remembrance instead. See Bainian Daowai vol. 1 (2005) pp. 43-44.  
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“autonomous” Chinese churches. At least some probably Catholic Poles can be found today in the “Orthodox” 
section (see below), which, however, also is used for Chinese Orthodox believers. Thus, the differentiation between 
ethnicity and creed is not too sharp. 
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 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 7. 
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 Wang Huiying (1996), pp. 85-86. 
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into Chinese: N. P. Kelajin (2007), preface p. 3.  




preserved and moved to Huangshan, though reframed by the Soviets (see below).
110
 The 




As it seems, when the issue of transfer arose in 1958, only a minority of 156 Orthodox had 
applied in the end for (costly) transfer.
112
 The more likely were the ones with family still around, 
those buried only very recently or being of particular importance to the foreign community in 
Harbin,
113
 though the real figure of transferred tombs might be higher than the application 
numbers suggest.
114
 The others were already deep buried (i.e. more than 2 meters beneath 
surface) and thus remained with the tombstones levelled.
115
 (The latter were at times used to 
reinforce the Sungari River embankment.
116
) Thus, at least according to Chinese statistics, the 
major group to be actually transferred was 853 Jews. Further foreigners transferred only 
amounted to 28, but the levelled tombs in 1958 totaled over 23.000.
117
 This means that only a 
tiny portion, which in time would be further reduced, opted for transfer. This was partly due to 
the fact that many émigrés had left (or had been made to leave) by the time, but also to the short-
term deadline between the announcement in early May and the initially set transfer date by end 
of June 1958!
118
 It should be also noted that the reason given in the announcement was 
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 Wang Huiying (1996), p. 86 and p. 90. 
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 While the “Ukrainian” church next to the “old” Orthodox cemetery is today active again, the church of the “new” 
cemetery in the Culture Park remains closed. Both (including the belfry), however, are now labelled protected 
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their rough location. 
113
 Of the earlier notables, e.g., the well-known physician Kazem-Bek (1892-1931) might be mentioned [cf. ill. 25]. 
The restoration of his tomb was one of the major projects of the Russian Club in Harbin together with former 
Russian “Harbiners” now overseas in the last years. See Sergey Eryomin: “Zabytye mogily?...” (Forgotten 
graves?...), July 29, 2015(a). Available online: http://www.russianchina.org/news/2015/07/29/6505#more-6505. 
114
 Eryomin (2015a) states that cases of old photos taken after the transfer show that there were tombs with wooden 
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Huangshan Orthodox cemetery which, in fact, at present has several unidentified mounds and parts overgrown. He 
presents a list of 459 names (which of course include also burials after the transfer). Available online: 
http://www.russianchina.org/news/2015/07/29/6505#more-6505. This suggests there might have been more 
transferals than the 156 given in Chinese sources. The newly set-up (still work-in-progress) website of Beijing’s 
Russian Cultural Center even claims 1.200 tombs that were initially transferred with over 650 tombs as of today! 
(Available online: http://russianculture.cn/ru/pravoslavnoe-kladbishhe-huanshan-g-harbin/). The basis of this claim 
is, however, not provided. 
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 The local authorities, however, drew up a map of the names and location, just in case. See Wang Huiying (1996), 
p. 89. 
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 Cf. Lomanov (2010), p. 831. 
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 See Wang Huiying (1996), p. 91. (Since the figures are similar in the various gazetteers of Harbin and also cited 
by scholars who had access to the archives, it may be assumed this is based on archival material.) 
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 The announcement was placed in the local newspaper Haerbin ribao 哈尔滨日报 (Harbin Daily) on May 7 (page 
4), repeated May 8 (page 2) and May 9 (page 4), with the deadline as of end of June. This, however, was not 
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conformity with the “eight not haves” for cities and the acquisition of the status of “hygienic city” 
alongside city development which required a removal of all inner-city cemeteries, explicitly 
including the foreign ones (to the apparent, though not mentioned, exclusion of the “Soviet 
Martyrs”). As the announcement stated bluntly, “all tombs must be transferred by the tomb 
owners on their own responsibility to the Huangshan zuizi cemetery before end of June, 1958; 
those not transferred by that time will be treated as owner-less tombs and will be deep buried by 
the government on spot.”119  
 
Although the Orthodox Church in Harbin had tried to prevent the transferal in 1958 in alliance 
with all other foreign faith groups still active,
120
 arguing on religious grounds but also that the 
dead were already buried deep enough to not pose a hygienic problem, adding that some of them 
even had been important to Harbin’s history,121  the Soviets had approved it and put up no 
resistance when the Chinese – in a typical “revolutionary” fashion – “corrected” the “wrong 
views” of the foreigners. Because of the protests by the religious communities of foreigners, the 
deadline was extended, but given the scattered families, in most cases even registration was not 
very realistic – and not encouraged either.  
 
As archival material cited in Chinese sources reveal, the local government used various measures 
to push through the decision: beyond the “help” of the Soviet consulate, the “educative” 
ideological work to “convince” the émigrés and the “model transfer” of the Orthodox clerics’ 
tombs from St. Nikolay (see below), it enlisted also local Orthodox Chinese to help with 
procedures, but on the other hand also intimidated those “obstinate” by taking the person who 
had gathered signatures for a petition against the transfer into police custody.
122
 On the positive 
side, the agreement to have the Orthodox set up a prayer hall, a facility for washing the bodies 
and for a caretaker along with some payment for the wall of the prior cemetery can be seen as 
measures to placate the Orthodox community, which at least had the Soviets to rely on, for the 
loss of the former site, and also the Jewish community which had the most to lose by the transfer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Deathscape: Grave Reform in Modern China, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2019. Digital volume available 
online: https://chinesedeathscape.supdigital.org/read/no-room-for-the-dead.) 
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 “Heilongjiangsheng Haerbinshi renmin weiyuanhui tonggao” 黑龙江省哈尔滨市人民委员会通告 (Announce-
ment of the People’s Committee of Harbin Municipality in Heilongjiang Province), Haerbin ribao 哈尔滨日报 
(Harbin Daily) May 7, 1958, p. 4.  
120
 As mentioned, most missionaries from Western countries had left by then. The more sizeable groups beyond the 
Orthodox who acted as spokespersons due to their connection to the Soviet consulate were the Jews, and Catholic 
Poles. 
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 This assertion was taken by the Chinese Communist authorities with apparent contempt at the time. 
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 Cf. Wang Zhijun 王志军 and Luan Junbo 栾钧博: “Eluosi dongzhengjiao de siwang guannian yu Haerbin 
dongzhengjiao muyuan bianqian” 俄罗斯东正教的死亡观念与哈尔滨东正教墓园变迁  (“The Russian Orthodox 
Death Concept and the Changes of Harbin Orthodox Church Cemetery”). In: Haerbin xueyuan xuebao 哈尔滨学院
学报 (“Journal of Harbin University”) 2018 no. 4, pp. 117-122. There p. 120. 




from its large and well-kept former site, was given compensation. Still, even the Chinese sources 
admit that the large majority of foreign tombs “with owners” were not transferred because the 
“owners” did not register or refused the transfer outright. Seen that way, the different measures 
taken had obviously failed with the émigrés. The “Culture Park” in the end was built covering 
the large areas of the Buddhist Jilesi, Jewish, Polish (intending Catholic) and Orthodox (i.e. the 
“new”) cemeteries of before.123 The other cemetery sections aside of them, namely of the “united” 
one, are now covered by sport facilities next to the “Culture Park”. 
 
Now, as to what resulted from the transfer, we may first take a look at the Jewish cemetery [ill. 
2], since in Chinese perspective, this was the somewhat more “successful” transfer case, making 
up the main group of those applying for transfer to Huangshan from the former “Culture Park” 
location. Apparently, after the transfer which started in 1958 (and according to Qu and Li ended 
only in 1961),
124
 very few new burials were done directly in Huangshan subsequently. Still, 
although the Jewish community in Harbin was dissolved in 1963, the last Jewish lady who died 
in Harbin, a “Russian”,125 was interred in Huangshan only in 1985:126 Hana Agre. Strange to say, 
she has been claimed dead since 1964 by both Israeli-Jewish and local Chinese official sources 
in spite of her having been interviewed by first-rate Western media in the 1980s!
127
 However, her 
tomb seems to have disappeared – or is elsewhere than in the Jewish Cemetery section.128 This 
means that burials in the Jewish Cemetery stopped in the early 1960s, the latest seemingly being 
Boris A. Nemik of September 24, 1963,
129
 and the cemetery thus is now a “historical” one. Of 
the three Huangshan Cemetery sections involving foreigners, the Jewish is the only one that has 
received some more in-depth scholarly attention to this point.
130
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 See the “Find a Grave” website for a photo of the tombstone: (https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/ 
141840919/boris-abramovich-nemik). 
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Madeleine Herren: “The Globalization of Death: Foreign Cemeteries in a Transnational Perspective”. In: Dan Ben-




The spatial arrangement of the Jewish cemetery already when at “Culture Park” reflected some 
hierarchy: thus, the rabbi was centrally placed, and also the “important” families close to him.131 
Although the books of the Jewish association counted 3.173 Jewish interments between 1903 and 
1958,
132
 there are only some 500 in Huangshan today.
133
 According to Chinese sources of the 
time of transfer, there were over 800 tombs moved, though not all with tombstones. In fact, today 
one finds several plaques where there are no preserved tombstones that have been probably 
installed during restorations according to name lists, though spellings vary [ill. 3, 4].
134
 Thus, it is 
open to question as to what happened to the missing ones, though it is highly probable that the 
time of the Cultural Revolution also meant to the Jewish cemetery (as for the rest of Huangshan 
cemetery) not only neglect, but large-scale destruction [ill. 5, 6].
135
 On the other hand, a present 
Israeli sojourner (whose voice might influence foreign, namely Jewish, perceptions) has raised 
doubts as to whether during the transfer maybe only tombstones have been transferred without 
any human remains, since in one specific case when a tomb of a couple needed restoration, no 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Canaan, Frank Grüner, Ines Prodöhl (eds.): Entangled Histories: The Transcultural Past of Northeast China, Cham: 
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coffins or bones were found beneath the tombstone.
136
 This general assertion, however, is 
strongly denied from the Chinese side.
137
 He also raised doubts as to the spatial arrangement at 
Huangshan being done without Jewish participation – contrary to claims during the transfer – as 
the direction of tombstones does not conform to Jewish practice. However, at the time of the 
transfer a small Jewish community was still in place to observe the whole, and one should 
consider the possibility that the present state does not need to go back to the transfer but might 
well be due to the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent “restorations” which are also 
mentioned in Chinese sources. The assumption that nothing happened to the Jewish cemetery in 
Huangshan during the Cultural Revolution (when it did to the neighboring Orthodox one, but 
also the Chinese parts of the cemetery), figuring so many Jewish “bourgeois” tombs [ill. 7, 8] is 
more than unlikely: and post-Cultural Revolution “restorations” often meant a “tidying up” 
above ground which might well have changed individual tombstone location and orientation. At 
least elsewhere in the PRC there was some documented preoccupation with the transfer of 





In any case, at the time of transfer the Jewish association was still present in Harbin, and thus 
they managed to argue for recompense for the wall and buildings they had had at the former 
location which was substantially larger than the space actually used. Thus, the Huangshan 
location for the Jews was fenced-in again and space was abundant – which probably enticed later 
cuts into the space when the Jewish association had ceased to exist in the city and burial space 
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 See Ben-Canaan’s comments on the case of the 2008 restoration of the tombs of the Ifland couple (location: 
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for others was urgently needed [ill. 9].
139
 A major renovation of the site was undertaken in the 




Although the Jewish cemetery is now historical and relatively well publicized for foreign 
relations,
141
 it is nevertheless striking, when having a closer look, as to how it is “preserved”: 
since the former prime minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, has a grandfather there, the tomb (which 
he visited in 2004 and 2009)
142
 is – unsurprisingly – well looked after [ill. 10],143 and Olmert’s 
thanks to the people of Harbin for caring is engraved on an obelisk at the entrance [ill. 11]. Also 
the tombs of the Kaufman family who were and are a pillar of Sino-Israeli connections via 
Harbin, are renewed and neat.
144
 However, the “spiritual leader” of the Jews of Harbin at the 
time was Ukrainian Rabbi Aron Moshe Kiselev who served the community from 1913 to his 
death in 1949 and who was buried centrally, as mentioned, in the Jewish cemetery when still at 
the “Culture Park” location.145 When checking now for the tomb of the “chief rabbi of all East 
Asia” in present-day materials on the cemetery, one finds him on the tables simply as “Aron 
Kiselev” (location 23-1).146 Although the tomb is visually impressive with its niche and colored 
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 For the cuts in space, cf. the illustration sheets in Zhang Tiejiang (2005) on the same page with the “old map” 
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Star of David and its purely Hebrew inscription [ill. 12],
147
 it seems this low-key treatment of the 
religiously central figure is on purpose. This is corroborated by the fact that although the rabbi’s 
descendants were received when they wanted to look after the tomb in 2004,
148
 he is nevertheless 
not included in the Chinese enumeration of “famous people” interred in the Jewish cemetery.149 
Those rather include merchants and businessmen, starting with the “first Jew” to settle in Harbin 
in 1899, Grigory B. Drizin from Russia, who died there after 50 years in 1949 at the notable old 
age of 103 years (tomb location: 22-05), or successful entrepreneurs. One may also note that at 
the time of transfer, the Jewish association had asked the religious authorities in Moscow and 
Israel about the procedures. Both agreed to the transfer, but from the side of Israel (which, as 
might be reminded, at the time had no diplomatic relations with the PRC) there was the request 
to transfer the remains of Rabbi Kiselev and his family to Israel.
150
 This, as it seems, was not 
granted. 
 
While the transfer and set-up in Huangshan of the by now “historical” case of the Jewish 
Cemetery could be largely arranged to the satisfaction of the Chinese authorities, things were 
much more difficult with the Orthodox [ill. 13, 14] who had strongly opposed the transfer from 
the start. The Chinese authorities thus tried to “convince” this group more specifically to accept 
the move by starting the transfer with 5 tombs of clerics buried at the St. Nikolay Cathedral, 
above all the first Bishop of Harbin and Metropolitan, Methodius/Mefody (Gerasimov), who had 
died in 1931.
151
 His tomb, however, cannot be found there today, neither any other of clerics of 
that earlier time. Thus, it is not clear as to what happened to them.
152
 Methodius’ successor, 
Meletius/Melety (Zaborovsky), who died in 1946, in any case was not included as he had not 
been buried at the Cathedral but at the Holy Annunciation Church, the largest church of all the 
orthodox churches built in Harbin in its final version, which was closed in 1958, i.e. at the time 
of transfer, and finally demolished during the Cultural Revolution.
153
 In Chinese eyes, he was a 
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only rarely mention the archival documents explicitly.) See for a short biography of Methodius/Mefody: http:// 
www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/harbin/methodiusgerasimov_en.htm. 
152
 It is not clear from the Chinese sources who were the other 4 clerics beyond Methodius intended. Eryomin’s 
(2015a) preliminary name list does not include Methodius/Mefody either. 
153
 According to Father Pozdnyaev, the remains of Meletius have been profaned when the Annunciation church (also 
called Blagoveshchensk) was closed in 1958 which means he obviously was not transferred. Dionisy Pozdnyaev: 




problematic figure anyway since he was head of the diocese during the Manchukuo/Japanese-
controlled era.
154
 Some Russian clerics who died between 1958 and 1962, however, can still be 
found [ill. 15], apparently the last being Father Baryshnikov who died in 1962. These clerics 
were thus likely buried directly in Huangshan. It might be noted that Father Baryshnikov’s 
tombstone has been inscribed on the back with the unique and telling plea to “please not smash 
his tombstone” in consideration of “his good deeds” “since he was very helpful in life to the 
people” [ill. 16, 17]. In another case, the tomb of a Russian priest was “covered” by a “wrongly 
placed” tombstone [ill. 18].155 In Orthodox circles stories of elder Russians who lived through 
the Cultural Revolution locally are transmitted about widespread vandalism of the Orthodox 
tombs, most of them of “normal” believers, during that period [ill. 19].156 It should be recalled 
that in 1962 the Sino-Soviet split had already led to the closure of the Soviet consulate in Harbin 
and thus to the end of any potential care (or at least monitoring) from that side.
157
 In terms of 
clerics, some tombs of later “indigenous” priests of Harbin are there today, to the notable 
exclusion of archpriest Wang Yulin 王玉林 who had been made head of the local “autonomous” 
Orthodox Church of China, served as the last head of the St. Nikolay Cathedral, was persecuted 
and died in the early days of the Cultural Revolution in 1967.
158
 To be found at present are, 
however: Archpriest He Hailin 何海林 [ill. 20], the apparently only one who died before the 
transfer (in 1956, having served at the Holy Annunciation church) and thus was apparently 
moved, Archpriest Wu Zhiquan吴志全 (of Manchu origin) who was tortured and died during 
the Cultural Revolution in 1970 [ill. 21], and the most recent one of priest Zhu Shipu 朱世朴 [ill. 
22] (of Manchu origin as well)
159
 who had revived services after the Cultural Revolution for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“The Chinese Autonomous Church” (1998). Available online: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/pozdnyaev/5_ 
en.htm.  
154
 He was accused of having collaborated with the Japanese, although he finally clashed with them over the issue of 
State Shintô. Cf. the comments from the Orthodox side by N. P. Razzhigaeva against the collaboration accuse as 
voiced, e.g., by Harbin scholar Li Shuxiao: “Tragic destiny of the Blagoveshchensk temple in Harbin”. Available 
online: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/harbin/tragicfateannunciation_en.htm. 
155
 This, at least, is stated by the explanatory plaque put up 2018 at the cemetery for the tomb of priest Mikhail 
Avsenev who died in 1959 on whose tomb a tombstone for a young woman who had died in 1932 was found, 
though not stating whether this was done as a safety measure or due to other reasons. Apart from priests, there are at 
least also two Russian former heads of the Kazan monastery in Harbin: monks Ignaty [ill. 15] and Serafim who both 




 The last Russian cleric had left just before the Cultural Revolution, in 1966. See Lomanov (2010), p. 832. 
157
 See the foreign affairs volume of the Heilongjiang province gazetteer Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: 
waishizhi (1993), p. 99. 
158
 For some very brief information on him, see the biographical notes: “Archpriest Anikita Wang Yulin”, 
http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/harbin/anikitawang_en.htm; and the Harbin gazetteer on religion: Haerbin 
shizhi: Zongjiao, fangyan (1998), p. 127, which state his being tortured. Father Pozdnyaev, though, claims he was 
relatively mildly treated since he tried to cooperate. Cf. Dionisy Pozdnyaev: “The Chinese Autonomous Church” 
(1998). Available online: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/pozdnyaev/5_en.htm. He is apparently a somewhat 
controversial figure in the Orthodox community. 
159
 See Tang Ge 唐戈: Eluosi wenhua zai Zhongguo: Renleixue yu lishixue de yanjiu 俄罗斯文化在中国。人类学
与历史学的研究 (“Russian Culture in China. A Study of Anthropology and History”), Harbin: Beifangwenyi 
chubanshe 2010, p. 329. 




few remaining Russians and the Chinese Orthodox, often of Sino-Russian descent [ill. 23, 24],
160
 
and who died of age in 2000. He was at the time the last Orthodox priest in Harbin, and thus he 
himself had to receive a lay funeral, since the authorities declined to invite a priest “from 
outside”.161 It was only in 2016 when a young Chinese orthodox priest (Yu Shi 遇石) took over 
again in Harbin,
162
 who is now also caring for the cemetery. 
 
Again in contrast to the Jewish Cemetery which is purely historical and less “problematic” for 
boosting its potential in international relations,
163
 with the Orthodox cemetery things are 
different, since the cemetery not only hosts historical figures, “positive” or “problematic” [ill. 25, 
26], but is still in use, now providing burial space for mainly Chinese Orthodox [ill. 27].
164
 One 
may note that the Funerary Regulations displayed at the Huangshan Cemetery and signed as of 
1998 by the Chinese Orthodox Church (which is, as mentioned, “autonomous” since 1956 as is 
required of all Christian Churches in the PRC), specify that earth burial is open only to 
minorities and foreign and “stateless” Orthodox (paragraph 11), suggesting that Chinese 
Orthodox should rather comply with the general “Chinese” rule of cremation. (In 1993, the 
municipal regulations had still shown some consideration of the general Orthodox rejection of 





More historically, a further notable feature of the Orthodox Cemetery in Huangshan is the 
integration of the memorials to the Russian soldiers who died during the Russo-Japanese War 
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 Tang Ge (2010), p. 141, stresses that the Chinese Orthodox he encountered were mainly of “mixed blood”, 
intending usually Russian mothers and Chinese fathers (or one generation further down). As it seems, most “pure” 
Russians never learned Chinese well, whereas the Chinese Orthodox did not speak Russian, thus dividing the parish 
de facto in two language groups with only sporadic interaction. 
161
 “Repose of priest Gregory Zhu, the caretaker of the Holy Protection Church in the City of Harbin (PRC)”. 
Available online: http://www.orthodox.cn/news/000923gregzhu_en.htm.  
162
 For a brief video on his ordination in Russia, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCKxzzkjMTk.  
163
 For a brief reflection on this history from the Chinese side, see local writer Acheng in his Haerbinren (2014), pp. 
261-264, and his longer work He shangdi… (2008), where he mentions the foreign cemeteries several times. 
164
 The table put up by the “Community of the Orthodox Church of Intercession” (i.e. the one-time “Ukrainian” 
church now serving as the church of the Orthodox parish) of June 10, 2018, points out some notable figures in the 
cemetery. The most recent non-Chinese was buried in 2006 at the very old age of 96: Efrosinya Andreevna 
Nikiforova. Another (less aged) one, Vladimir Alekseevich Zinchenko who died in 2002, had been interviewed by 
John Burns of the New York Times in 1985 (Burns: “Russian legacy…”). Others are named on Orthodox websites, 
e.g. http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/harbin/20060317cemetery_en.htm. One of the fairly recent newly 
documented cases are the Soviet students of the Harbin Polytechnical Institute who died in 1946 during local 
violence and belonged to those transferred. Sergey Gribin: “Pyat' fotografy - pyat' korotkikh sudeb” (Five photos - 
five short fates). Available online: http://www.unification.com.au/articles/read/2588/. Apparently, being neither 
soldiers nor (later) advisors, they were not admitted to the “Soviet” cemetery but at the time were buried in the 
orthodox one and from there transferred to Huangshan. 
165
 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), appendix, p. 117. Given the lack of clerics beyond Fr. Zhu Shipu at the time, this 
was rather an on-principle declaration, though. 




1904/05. The commemoration of these casualties had been a common part of any Russian 
remembrance of the dead in Harbin in pre-PRC times.
166
 Since that war is regarded by the 
Chinese as fought by two imperialists on Chinese soil, a commemoration of the Russian soldiers 
was out of question to the local Chinese. It was therefore only possible to commemorate them in 
the context of their (predominantly) Orthodox affiliation, and thus the military memorials, when 
transferred, were grouped with the other Orthodox tombs,
167
 and not with the “military 
successors” of the Soviet Army casualties. Whereas one large memorial is a generic one for the 
Russian soldiers of the Russo-Japanese War who died from their wounds in Harbin’s hospitals 
[ill. 28], another is an individual one for Captain Aleksandr Kornil’ev (1864-1904), a high-
ranking naval officer who died of tuberculosis in Harbin after having commanded a Russian 
destroyer at Port Arthur (Lüshun) in early skirmishes with the Japanese [ill. 29]. The two 
monuments had been transferred to Huangshan in 1958 but underwent notable changes, likely 
due to Soviet interference, “crowning” them at this point with a Soviet red star, and receiving 
“new” inscriptions in “modern” Russian to put praise on their “loyalty to the motherland”, by 
this smoothing the way for a Soviet “appropriation” (and easing things regarding Chinese 
sensibilities). The present outlook, though, again without the Soviet star and with re-installed 




Furthermore, the Orthodox Cemetery also covers, beyond Orthodox of other countries than 
“Russia”,169 also some Catholic Poles [ill. 30],170 which means that also some foreign Catholics 
ended up there: the most notable case is Wladyslaw Kowalski (1870-1940), an outstanding 
entrepreneur and important figure of the sizable Polish community of Harbin who was very 
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 See, e.g., the description of rites at the inner-city Orthodox cemeteries in pre-PRC times in Rong Jie et al. (2011), 
p. 75-76. 
167
 There had been memorials at the “old” and the “new” inner-city Orthodox cemeteries, as well as the 
commemoration tablets in the Iveron Church of the Amur Army close to the railway station. See, e.g., Rong Jie 
(2011), p. 76. The two now in the Huangshan Orthodox Cemetery are mostly said to have been transferred from the 
“old” Orthodox one. See also Wang Zhijun and Luan Junbo (2018), p. 121. A 1992 survey, though, argued only 
Captain Kornil’ev was transferred from the “old” one, whereas the “collective” memorials were originally 3 and all 
in the “new” one. (See Haerbinshi renmin zhengfu difangzhi bangongshi (1992), p. 144.) 
168
 For details, see Sergey Eryomin: “Zagadka dvukh kharbinskikh obeliskov” (The riddle of the two Harbin 
obelisks) (2014). Available online: http://www.unification.com.au/articles/2539/. A photo of the formerly “updated” 
Kornil’ev stele with the Soviet star can be found in Kelajin [Kradin] (2007), p. 51. 
169
 Not surprisingly, given the extension of the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union, this included 
Ukrainians, Belarusians, but also others. A more well-known – if controversial – personality is the Georgian Ivlian 
Khaindrava who was a leading figure in the Georgian community at good terms with the Japanese/Manchukuo side 
(and less so with the Russians). See on him, e.g., Hiroaki Kuromiya and Georges Mamoulia: The Eurasian Triangle: 
Russia, The Caucasus and Japan, 1904-1945, Berlin and Warsaw: de Gruyter Open, 2016, p. 66 and p. 104.  
170
 The Polish authorities list nine Poles buried in the Huangshan Orthodox Cemetery. See the report of November 2, 
2012, on the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consular Information website, reporting the activities to honor the 
dead in Harbin on All Saints’ Day, available online: https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polonia/ 
wydarzenia/azja/chiny__obchody_dnia_wszystkich_swietych. Their tombs usually figure a “Latin” cross. 




active in building Catholic Churches there.
171
 It should, of course, also be noted, that the Poles – 
as the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians – were “socialist” at the time of transfer, i.e. the 
dead of post-war “politically friendly” parts of the world (in Chinese perspective) were those 
more likely to be transferred in 1958 to Huangshan.
172
 Russian Orthodox visitors in 2006, though, 
noted that comparing to the by then well cared-for Jewish cemetery, the Orthodox one was 
dilapidating.
173
 Probably due to the fact that 2006 was proclaimed the “year of Russia in China”, 
the Harbin government gave money to at least reconstruct the main gate and the fence. 
 
The Soviet Cemetery [ill. 31], in turn, was decided to be moved apparently in the context of this 
“year of Russia in China” and the immediately following “year of China in Russia” in 2007. As 
stated, the Soviet Cemetery had remained in the “Culture Park” area until that time,174 and it was 
the last foreign “addendum” to Huangshan. Visitors to the earlier site in the 1980s at a time when 
relations between China and the Soviet Union were only starting to warm up, noted the complete 
neglect of it.
175
 According to Aleksandr Kirillin, the responsible for the memorialization of 
Russian soldiers fallen “in the defense of the fatherland” from the side of the Russian Ministry of 
Defense who had led the fact-finding tour in 2004 to China, negotiations with the Chinese were 
more complicated than with other countries since there was no way of mutuality, given the 
absence of Chinese military tombs in Russia.
176
 Still, by April of 2007 the Sino-Russian 
agreement was signed with a Chinese promise to care for Soviet soldiers’ tombs and memorials 
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 On his trajectory, see Mariusz Borysiewicz: “Wladyslaw Kowalski (1870-1940): Polish Pioneer of 
Industrialization in the Far East”. In: Scripta Historica No. 23 (2017), pp. 83-107. Available online: https://ssh.apsl. 
edu.pl/baza/wydawn/ssh023/83-108.pdf. During the Japanese-Manchukuo regime, he was deprived of his business 
opportunities and died bankrupt in Harbin in 1940. For some more general information on the sizable community of 
Poles in Harbin and Manchuria, see Thomas Lahusen: “Colonized Colonizers: The Poles of Manchuria”. In: Mariko 
Asano Tamanoi (ed.): Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press 
2005, pp. 150-164. See also Liu Yannian (2016), pp. 052-057, on Polish Catholicism in Harbin. On the fate of the 
single Catholic churches, see the Harbin Religion gazetteer: Haerbin shizhi: zongjiao, fangyan (1998), pp. 72-82. 
172
 The on-spot plaque speaks also of Germans. Sergey Eryomin and others who have set up that plaque are 
researching into the people interred and plan a publication (personal communication, July 30, 2018). There are 
already over 580 names they identified. See “Kuda ukhodit russkiy Kharbin: Zhurnalist AP posetil russkoe 
kladbishche v Kharbine” (Whereto is Russian Harbin headed? The journalist of the AP visited the Russian cemetery 
in Harbin”. In: Amurskaya Pravda (Amur Truth), September  13, 2012. Available online: https://www.ampravda.ru/ 
2012/09/13/036197.html. (One may note that this figure of 580 in 2012 is far beyond the above-cited list Eryomin 
published three years later in 2015(a) with 459 names: http://www.russianchina.org/news/2015/07/29/6505#more-
6505). 
173Alexander Jaroshenko and Dmitry Napara: “Russian islet in the corn sea” (2006). Available online: http://www. 
orthodox.cn/ contemporary/harbin/20060317cemetery_en.htm. 
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 For photos of the earlier site, see Ivanov et al. (1997), pp. 177-178. (As mentioned above, Ivanov was a veteran 
of the 1945 “August Storm”: he had entered Harbin on a tank in 1945 and acted later as vice-head of the Sino-
Russian friendship association.) 
175
 See Burns: “Russian legacy…” (1985) who wrote of 200 tombs which were overgrown almost completely, while 
the local Russians told him the Orthodox ones had been “taken away”, looting the coffins for gold rings and golden 
teeth. This, in turn, suggests that the remaining Russians were not all clear about the meanwhile Huangshan location 
of some of the earlier Orthodox buried. 
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 Cf. the interview with him, cited in the Russian daily Kommersant (Businessman), August 30, 2010, p. 6: 
“Vozvrashcheniye v Port-Artur” (Return to Port Arthur). 




(being less controversial than non-Soviet Russian ones) located on Chinese soil,
177
 and this 
agreement provided the general background also to the transfer in Harbin, where there had been 
complaints by Russian visitors about the misfit in location of the tombs inside the “Culture Park” 
which hosts an amusement park today. Thus, the transfer to Huangshan was done in just one 
month,
178
 but only reported in the Russian media to some extent, although both the Russian and 
the Chinese Foreign Ministers attended the opening.
179
 While the leading Harbin newspaper did 
not write about it at all,
180
 Beijing’s official Renmin ribao人民日报 (People’s Daily) only added 
one sentence while reporting on the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers.
181
 According to 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, 12.000 Soviet soldiers died, “liberating China”, of whom 104 
were now honored in the Soviet Cemetery in Huangshan.
182
 The Sino-Russian official list, 
though, counts 111 “martyrs”, of whom 89 are individuated (put according to rank) and 22 are 
anonymous.
183
 As has been noted in Chinese surveys, it is not quite clear from where the 
“liberating Soviet martyrs” (as they are called in Chinese vs. the simpler “Soviet Military 
Cemetery" diction in Russian) of 1945 were transferred at that time, to be then “centrally” buried 




Beyond the “martyrs”, there are also some who died after the August 1945 battles, including 
Soviet specialists of the early 1950s who were transferred to the Huangshan Soviet Cemetery as 
well. Their tombstones are marked by a different outlook [ill. 32], as is the case with the officers, 
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 On the Sino-Russian April agreement regarding Soviet Red Army cemeteries, see Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 225.  
178
 This is proudly stated on the on-spot plaque. 
179
 Since the visit of Lavrov also included the more spectacular news of a triangle meeting with the Foreign Minister 
of India, most Chinese reports on the Harbin visit concentrated on the latter. The Soviet Cemetery opening thus 
remained in the shadow. 
180
 The Haerbin ribao as the main local newspaper only reported on Lavrov’s presence but nothing on the cemetery 
opening. 
181
 Zhang Guangzheng 张光政: “Yang Jiechi huijian Eluosi waizhang Lafuluofu” 杨洁篪会见俄罗斯外长拉夫罗
夫 (Yang Jiechi meets Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov). In: Renmin ribao 人民日报 (People’s Daily) October 25, 
2007, p. 11. 
182
 A transcript of Lavrov’s speech at the opening is available online: “Transcript of Remarks by Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Unveiling Ceremony for a New Memorial Complex to Soviet Army Soldiers 
Who Fell in Northeast China, Harbin, October 24, 2007”, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/cn/-/asset_ 
publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/359678. 
183
 See the Memorial database of the Russian Ministry of Defense: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm? 
id=84128872&p=1, which provides as source this Sino-Russian list, finally signed in 2010. The basis of this list is, 
de facto, Ivanov et al.’s survey of 1996 as published in 1997 in Ivanov et al., pp. 179-181. They had individuated 91 
casualties. (For photos of the cemetery in the mid-1990s, i.e. still at the Culture Park location, see also there pp. 177-
178). 
184
 Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 83.  As mentioned, Tian notes that most of the larger cemeteries are not where the battles 
were (often waged in not easily accessible places where later a stele might be put), but the Soviets moved the dead 
to these cemeteries to bury them centrally. (Tian 2010, p. 21). He complains (p. 174) that the Soviets did not leave 
any archival material to the Chinese which might also explain why Chinese and Russian descriptions of site details 
often vary. 




while the soldiers have their typical identical tombstones.
185
 Some of these were newly made 
since the old ones had been in a bad shape.
186
 Soviet-Russian figures appearing on an archival 
card about the “Culture Park” location list 203 Soviet names of which 110 were individual 
graves, the other 93 were collectively memorialized with a stele, but the individual graves 
included also some post-war dead (military staff or not), most notably two women: a female 
surgeon and a female technician-lieutenant.
187
 At that time, the responsible entities for the 
cemetery were named as the People’s Government of Harbin Municipality together with the 
Russian Orthodox Church, and as representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense the Military 
Attaché at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the PRC. By this naming one may conclude 
that although the card used was of 1990 and of the USSR Ministry, the time it was filled in must 
have been after December 1991, i.e. the time the “Russian Federation” had been declared. The 
website of the present Russian Ministry of Defense now lists 302 names under the burial place 
“Harbin” which seems, however, to double entries between the 111 and the 203 lists,188 again 
including the non-combatant specialists.
189
 This suggests that from the Russian perspective, the 
cemetery was seen as for “Soviets” more broadly, whereas the Chinese officially only talk about 
the “Soviet martyrs” who died “for the liberation of China” by fighting the Japanese (whereas 
the Russian inscriptions on the central large common stele tellingly honor the “heroes” only for 
fighting for the USSR without naming the Chinese).  
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 It may be added that this way of differentiating according to rank also in tombstone outlook was common in 
military cemeteries before the World Wars. Thereafter a “democratization” of tombstones became more widespread 
in Western countries, as can be seen, e.g., in the US and British war graves, where only the inscription reveals the 
specifics. Cf. the example of Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemeteries in Hong Kong in my previous 
study: Gotelind Müller: Challenging dead: a look into foreigners’ cemeteries in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 
Heidelberg and Berlin: CrossAsia-Repository, 2018(b), pp. 16-17 and pp. 42-44. (Available online: DOI: 
https://doi.org/10. 11588/xarep.00004145). The Soviets, though, visually stress the rank. 
186
 See Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 109. This book mainly addresses the Lüshun cemetery (see below) but also covers 
other places of “Soviet martyrs” in China. The possibility that the need to make new tombstones might have been 
also due to Cultural Revolution period “interventions” is not addressed. According to Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 81, all 
tombs had originally a photo but these “are now lost” (as can be clearly seen from the empty spaces). 
187
 See the Memorial website of the Russian Ministry of Defense: e.g. https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm? 
id=262076766&p=5, which gives 203 burials as “known”. The provided source printed on the paper of the 
predecessor of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the former Ministry of Defense of the USSR, shows a handwritten 
correction of 91 to 93 (on its p. 2) of recorded names on the main monument, plus 110 individual tombs, arriving at 
the total of 203. On the document’s pp. 4-7 some specialists are named. In all, there appear 13 people with some 
individual date listed, some military staff, some not, who were obviously not falling under the main category of 
those who died during the battles against the Japanese in 1945 as “martyrs”/”heroes”.  
188






 See, e.g., the entry on the “Soviet specialist” Vasily N. Fomin who died in 1954 and seems to be the last one to 
die of those represented. Available online: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262076888. 




In any case, in 2007 all that was still there in the “Culture Park” 190  was transferred to 
Huangshan’s “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” (and not to the Orthodox one, e.g., in spite of the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s role as co-responsible for the Soviet Cemetery), by this, in a sense, 
continuing the division between the “Whites” and the “Reds” also at the new location, or – seen 
from a Chinese Communist perspective – keeping the distinction between those “having helped 
China” (as soldiers or specialists) and “the others”. As the agreement between Russia and the 
PRC in 2007 had stated, the Chinese were guaranteeing only for the former ones, and – as will be 
seen in the following – the Chinese were adamant in keeping a clear differentiation between the 
“Soviet friends” and the “Russian rest”, be it tsarist-imperial, e.g. with the Russo-Japanese War 




Dalian and Lüshun 
 
Whereas Harbin has been the railway nodal point in the North of Manchuria, Dalian and Lüshun 
were at the southern end of it, connecting the Siberian land mass via the railway with the Yellow 
Sea and the Bohai Gulf respectively. Dalian functioned mainly as a civil port, and Lüshun as a 
naval one. Today, Lüshun or Lüshunkou (because of the harbor) is administratively part of 
Dalian municipality. Before, both were named together “Lü-Da”. The location just opposite the 
Shandong peninsula made for receiving many migrants from there who either worked in 
Manchuria temporarily or settled down to stay.
191
 Thus, a substantial part of the Han population 
in the area and further up in Manchuria is from Shandong. The main administrative center of the 
southern Liaodong peninsula before the 19th century, though, was slightly further north in 
Jinzhou, today part of Dalian municipality as well and located at the nearest strip of the 
Liaodong peninsula between the two coasts.  
 
The protected harbor of Lüshun was used early on for the military, first catching the eyes of 
foreigners with the British in the mid-19th century to whom it owes its “Western” name “Port 
Arthur”. The Qing thus realized its military potential as well, and on the suggestion of a German 
advisor, the influential official Li Hongzhang chose it in the 1880s as a major navy port for the 
Chinese. In consequence, Lüshun became a focal point during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95. 
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 In the early 1990s, the number provided was 110 single tombs of “Soviet martyrs” there. See Heilongjiang 
shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), p. 189. As this source also notes (p. 190) with reference to archival 
material, the tombs were partly damaged during the Cultural Revolution and only a part of them was reconstructed 
thereafter. 
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 Cf. Gottschang and Lary (2000). 




The place became famous in a tragic way when the Japanese finally conquered the walled city 
and committed a massacre that shocked the world at the time.
192
 Although the Japanese claimed 
the Liaodong peninsula as a war booty in 1895, they were pressured by Russia, Germany and 
France to return it to the Qing against compensation, the Russians then striking themselves a deal 
with Li Hongzhang for the setting up of the railway and the lease of the Dalian-Lüshun area (the 
so-called Kwantung Leased Territory, Guandongzhou 关东州) in 1898. Thus, Dalian (at first 
called Dal’ny, i.e. “far” in Russian) as a city was a Russian creation, much like Harbin,193 
connected to the building of the railway, but its fate diverged from Harbin already in the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904/05 since thereafter the Southern Manchurian Railway, as this end of the 
railway was called now, remained in the hands of the Japanese. In fact, whereas Harbin was built 
up by the Russians, in Dalian in spite of large initial investment,
194
 time for actual building was 
simply short, and thus much of the Russian plans were realized only under the Japanese who 




Lüshun as the crucial naval port had not only borne the brunt in the area during the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894/95, but fared also much worse than the newly founded Dal’ny during the 
Russo-Japanese war 1904/05, at least (though not exclusively) in perspective of the Russians 
there: the Russian navy anchored in “their” harbor, but when the Japanese repeatedly blocked the 
entrance and – after a long siege – attacked from the landside rear, the shelter turned into trap. 
By this coup, the Russian naval fleet in the Far East was virtually annihilated. For staging the 
assault, which cost the Japanese dearly, the Japanese had landed at various places to the north of 
Lüshun, including near the formerly walled town of Jinzhou. Both the battles at Jinzhou and the 
subsequent ones in Lüshun were very bloody, especially for the victorious Japanese for whom 
this first major war against a European power had also an immense symbolic value. Japanese 
general Nogi Maresuke 乃木希典 lost also two of his own sons, one at Jinzhou when capturing 
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 This massacre had been preceded by Chinese provocations though, exhibiting mutilated Japanese soldiers to 
“deter” the Japanese army which backfired, a fact which is conveniently sidelined in today’s highly politicized 
black-and-white memorialization and exploitation of the Japanese atrocities by the Chinese official version of that 
history, most bluntly exhibited at the memorial for the massacre in Lüshun turned into a patriotic education 
showcase basis: Wanzhongmu 万忠墓 (lit.: tomb of the 10.000 loyal ones). After the event had become known, the 
Japanese held memorial services for the dead “Qing soldiers” (circumventing the problem of the massacred civilians) 
to polish their reputation. See some photographs for such activities in nearby Jinzhou in Fang Jun 方军 and Wang 
Shengli 王胜利 (ed.): Dalian jinbainian fengyun tulu 大连近百年风云图录 (A pictorial record of the event in 
Dalian’s recent 100 years), Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe 1999, part 4, photos 20-22. For photos of the 
Wanzhongmu-site and its commemorialization through times, see Lüshunkouqu shizhi bangongshi旅顺口区史志办
公室  and Dalianshi jindaishi yanjiusuo大连市近代史研究所 (eds.): Lüshun tushi旅顺图史 (A pictorial history of 
Lüshun), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2012, pp. 52-55. 
193
 Here, too, the place only featured small fishing villages before, which also engaged in salt production. For a 
general overview on Dalian city up to 1955, see the PhD dissertation by Christian A. Hess: “From colonial jewel to 
socialist metropolis: Dalian, 1895–1955”, University of California, San Diego 2006. 
194
 This expenditure gained the city the nickname “superfluous” in Russian. 
195
 For some less often encountered Russian photos of early Dalian (though the dating of the photos is not always 
clear), see the Russian blog: https://humus.livejournal.com/2649377.html. 




Nanshan 南山 (southern hill), and one at Lüshun when fighting for the commanding heights of 
the “hill 203” (and other forts on the hills around the harbor) from which the Russian Far Eastern 
Squadron then was annihilated.
196
 On the other hand, for Russia, where this war was – in contrast 
to Japan – not popular at all, the war’s outcome meant a disaster, above all since in Lüshun (Port 
Arthur) the Russian army general Stessel had simply surrendered after the navy’s defeat and 
Japanese advances on land, which fed into the revolutionary mood of the 1905 revolution in 
Russia. Thus, “Port Arthur” became a symbol for the incompetence of Russia’s elites. For 
Lüshun and the whole area, a long time under Japanese domination followed, i.e. 1905-1945, and 
during this time the Russian and the Japanese memorialization of the Russo-Japanese war 
intermingled. After 1905 the Japanese had the complete say in the whole area, the so-called 
“Kwantung leased territory”. Even after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 it was still the 
Japanese Kwantung Army effectively pulling the strings locally. 
 
When in 1945 the Japanese had to capitulate, the whole area, now called Lüda, was a military 
special zone officially under Sino-Soviet co-management. It had been decided already in 
February 1945 between the US, UK and the Soviet Union that the Dalian trade port should be 
internationalized with special Soviet privileges, while the Soviet Union would be entitled to 
station her navy in Lüshun. (This, basically, was to entice the Soviets into promising to enter 
sooner or later the Far Eastern war theatre at a time the European war was drawing to a close.) 
And the Soviets agreed to sign a cooperation accord with the Guomindang government to this 
avail. In the August 14 accord between the Guomindang and the Soviet Union, more details were 
spelled out. However, the Soviets who had entered the war against Japan on August 9 and 
“liberated” the Dalian-Lüshun area – their major point of interest in Manchuria –197 by August 
22 without local bloodshed,
198
 were not ready to share much with the Chinese Guomindang 
government in practice. E.g. they refused the landing of Guomindang troops after the Japanese 
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 For photos of the sons of Nogi and their steles during the Japanese era, see Lüshun tushi (2012), part 4. See also 
the fascinating stories of the ups and downs of respective stele commemorations in the Jinzhou area in Cui Shihao 
崔世浩 (ed.): Liaonan beike 辽南碑刻 (Stele inscriptions south of the Liao [River]), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 2007, 
p. 199 ff. The stele of the second son of Nogi who died on “hill 203” in Lüshun was destroyed during the Cultural 
Revolution – as other left-over Japanese steles. (See Ye Liqun 叶立群: Lüshunkou shiji 旅顺口史记 (Historical 
record of Lüshunkou), Beijing: Haichao chubanshe 1988, p. 4 and p. 71.) The presently standing one, thus, is new. 
197
 Apart from the old bills of the Russo-Japanese War open there, the excellent port facilities and the by-now very 
developed industrial area were the prime targets for the Soviets. The more problematic sides of the Soviet 
“liberation” for the inhabitants, e.g. rampant violence and frequent rapes during the first period, as well as the 
tensions between the Soviets and parts of the local CCP is usually excluded from PRC narratives. Cf. Christian Hess: 
“Big Brother is Watching: Local Sino-Soviet Relations and the Building of New Dalian, 1945-55”. In: Jeremy 
Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz: Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Year of the People’s Republic of China, 
Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 2007, pp. 161-183. 
198
 The 1945 war casualties buried in the Dalian, Jinzhou and Lüshun cemeteries were, therefore, transferred there 
from places in the larger region where actual battles with the Japanese occurred. On a side note, the Soviets did not 
hasten to free the prisoners in Lüshun’s notorious prison which – according to Chinese complaints – enabled the 
Japanese to kill the prisoners and destroy the evidence before handing over the keys. (Cf. Ye Liqun 1988, p. 99). 




surrender, arguing Dalian was open for “trade” only,199 prompting the Guomindang to retaliate 
by trying to blockade both harbors, Dalian and Lüshun. Only Soviet ships which delivered goods 
transported from Vladivostok could not be blocked by the Guomindang, which saw the area as a 
by-now Soviet-CCP hotbed.
200
 The shortage of goods made itself soon felt locally, leading to a 
substantial drop in population, augmented by diseases spreading in the immediate post-WWII 
years. Similar to Harbin but different from most of Manchuria, in a military sense Lüda thus 
remained outside of the Chinese Civil War 1946-49, being de facto under Soviet Military 
command which tended to hold on to these two ice-free ports. Still, the blockade of the harbors 
meant economic shortage which not only led to a substantial reduction of inhabitants by those 
leaving the area for good, including the large group of Japanese residents who were repatriated in 
waves mainly in 1947, but also to the named food shortage and problems in health care for those 
staying, which is reflected in the relatively high number of dead, including infants, at the 
cemeteries during those years. 
 
After 1949 and the establishment of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet co-management became more real, 
and in view of the Korean War (1950-1953) geographically so close-by, the Chinese Commu-
nists were also very eager to have the officially not involved Soviets there. Although today this 
part of history is somewhat sensitive as it does not fit well into the main narrative line of official 
historiography,
201
 Mao himself asked the Soviets to stay on even after 1953 for fear of an Allied 
intervention. Finally, it was agreed that the Soviets would leave in 1955, at the occasion of which 
steles of Sino-Soviet friendship were installed,
202
 and thus the Lüda area was all in all 10 years 
under Soviet domination: 1945-1955,
203
 which meant also that information policies there were 
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 For Chinese versions of the various treaties, accords and details on the political discussions, see Sulian hongjun 
zai Lüda 苏联红军在旅大 (The Soviet Red Army in Lüda), internal publication, 1995, pp. 255-354. 
200
 This was quite apt, in spite of some rivalry between local cadres and the Soviets, as also CCP top cadres (who 
had reined in local cadres) stated in 1948: without the stationed Soviet troops, Lüda would not have come that easily 
into CCP hands in the end. Cf. Sulian hongjun zai Lüda (1995), p. 367. 
201
 This is also one of the reasons why the archives here are notoriously difficult to access even for Chinese 
researchers, let alone foreigners. Even publications on this time were usually “internal” up to the 1990s. See, e.g., 
the material collection Sulian hongjun zai Lüda (1995). (As the postscript reveals, it is based on materials of the 
Dalian CCP party history bureau which, according to the preface, were then assembled by the Dalian history 
gazetteer bureau which – as can be seen in the following – produced most of the official narratives on Lüda.) Only 
in the very last years publication policies have somewhat relaxed, and the topic made it even onto local TV with a 
documentary (see below) with the same title (Sulian hongjun zai Lüda) that came out in 2015 on the occasion of the 
70th anniversary of WW II’s end. 
202
 E.g., General Peng Dehuai 彭德怀 and Song Qingling as a government representative came to lay the foundation 
of the friendship stele in Lüshun for which Zhou Enlai penned the inscription. For photos, see, e.g., Lüshun tushi 
(2012), p. 250. Furthermore, generals He Long and Nie Rongzhen as well as Guo Moruo participated. (See Sulian 
hongjun zai Lüda 1995: p. 376). 
203
 In China, due to the ameliorated relations to Russia, more outspokenly positive evaluations are also coming out in 
the last years. See, e.g., Leng Yibin 冷一彬 and Jiang Yaohui 蒋耀辉: Yongheng de jiyi: Sulian hongjun zai Lüda 
(1945-1955) 永恒的记忆。苏联红军在旅大 (1945-1955) (Eternal memory: The Soviet Red Army in Lüda, 1945-
1955), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 2015. A convenient, if clearly one-sided, chronology of the 10 “Soviet years” can 
be found in Sulian hongjun zai Lüda (1995), pp. 357-378. 




largely controlled by the Soviets, leaving a very favorable impression of the Soviet Union with 
many locals, especially those who grew up in those years.
 204
 The major newspapers printed 
speeches of Soviet leaders and wrote about the exemplary character of the Soviet Union in 
various regards. Thus, the Soviet Union’s image as “elder brother” from whom to learn was 
propagated. However, present-day Chinese information policies stress that the PRC government 
always insisted on Chinese sovereignty and consistently differentiated between the Soviets and 
the tsarist Russians. Thus, the Chinese visitor to Lüshun is reminded that although the Soviet 
government originally wanted to honor also the tsarist outstanding figures of the Russo-Japanese 
War who died in the “defense” of Lüshun, namely Admiral Makarov who drowned with the 
Russian flagship and General Kondratenko who was shot at the batteries (see below), by building 
memorials to them,
205
 the PRC government would not agree, viewing them as imperialists and 
aggressors to China, to only keep reminders of the Soviet “liberation” of Lüda from the Japanese 




The years of Soviet occupation of the area are reflected also in the fact today, that there are still 
places called “Stalin road” etc. in Lüshun: something long gone almost everywhere else in 
China.
207
 And Sino-Soviet signs of friendship are still much around, in spite of the later Sino-
Soviet split. This particular history also makes for the well-known inaccessibility of the local 
archives for researchers, foreigners in particular: there is too much that should be kept under 
control. Lüshun, furthermore, was taken over later by the Chinese navy, and in fact free touristic 
access was only allowed after 2008, reducing the closed-off military areas to a minimum. 
 
In terms of Russian cemeteries, the area still has three in all: one in Dalian itself where the civil 
center had been located, hosting also some other foreign dead and the “normal” Russians living, 
trading and working there. At Jinzhou, the cemetery was first set up for the casualties of the 
Russo-Japanese War, but later also received burials of Soviets living in the area during the 1945-
55 period. And finally in Lüshun, the by far largest cemetery which also boasts of being the 
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 See Sulian hongjun zai Lüda (1995), p. 15. Trajectories as the one of Prof. Zhang Daxian (see below) and the 
Chinese Russian choir nostalgic of that time bespeak the emotional attachment some young local Chinese developed 
towards the Soviet Union at the time. For Dalian’s specific place in the socialist world and its youth activities, see 
Christian Hess: “Sino-Soviet City: Dalian between Socialist Worlds, 1945-1955”. In: Journal of Urban History vol. 
44, no. 1 (2018), pp. 9-25. At the Lüshun cemetery, a Chinese inscription on one of the last tombstones erected for a 
Soviet expert also bespeaks some personal ties. 
205
 It might be noted that to this day Makarov’s statue dominates the square in Kronstadt, the home base of the 
Russian navy Peter the Great once built close to St. Petersburg, while Kondratenko’s tomb in St. Petersburg’s 
Aleksandr Nevsky Monastery is well preserved to the present and names the respective cemetery section. The two, 
in a way, represent the tragic, but “honorable face” of Russian war endeavors during the Russo-Japanese War by 
dying with their men in action. 
206
 This is the historical narrative viewers are confronted with on a large explanatory plaque detailing the 
background of the Soviet Victory Stele in Lüshun, one of Lüshun’s main touristic attractions. 
207
 Harbin, for one, still features a “Stalin Park”. 




largest foreigners’ cemetery on Chinese soil, can be found.208 It was at first mainly used for the 
Russian casualties of the Russo-Japanese war, often buried after the war by the victorious 
Japanese in the area where the first Russian dead during railway construction had been buried. 
Later, the Soviet “martyrs” who “liberated” Southern Manchuria in 1945 were buried there as 
well, as were the Soviet aviators fallen in the Korean War. Since the Soviet Union was not 
officially participating in that war, the involvement of these Soviet aviators had to be kept 
secret,
209
 and this was also one further reason why the Lüshun area was off limits for such a long 
time. This, however, did not completely spare the Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery of vandalism in the 




As for the Dalian cemetery for Russians, located in Dalian’s central Zhongshan 中山 district, this 
is since 2009 called “Dalian Qingyunjie Sujun lieshi muyuan” 大连青云街苏军烈士墓园 
(Dalian Qingyun Street Soviet martyrs cemetery) (notably in Russian again without “martyrs”: 
“Soviet military cemetery”).211 As the on-spot stone sign, put up 2009, claims in accordance with 
the official gazetteers, it is built as an extension of the former cemetery built around the turn of 
the 20th century, and since 1945 hosts a part of the “martyrs” and other military personnel who 
died on the Liaodong peninsula up to 1956.
212
  While the soldiers were usually buried with flat 
tombstones [ill. 33], the officers received steles with a red star on [ill. 34].
213
 In all, the number 
of 612 tombs are given, comprising 371 Soviet military tombs, 54 family members (including 
many children), and the rest (i.e. 187) being “other” Russians or other foreigners.214 With these 
“other” Russians, the tsarist, émigré and non-military-connected civilians are intended. As the 
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 For some old photos taken by Russians, see the orthodox.cn website, e.g. “Dalian graves”: http://www.orthodox. 
cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/19130901iskryPg268-269_en.htm. 
209
 The US, however, had realized early on that they were de facto combatting skilled aviators from the Soviet Union 
but also preferred to not address the issue openly to not get into a full-scale world war. But neither did the Chinese 
side want to credit the Soviet aviators’ decisive role during the times of the Sino-Soviet split, not the least because it 
could diminish the sacrifice of the Chinese “volunteers” in the Korean War. Cf. Ma Dianwen (2015), pp. 17-19. 
210
 Since the archives are not accessible, it is hard to find any sources for that period when Lüshun was still closed 
off. However, occasionally in printed sources there are hints. In fact, the destruction noted by Aleksandr Koval in 
1996 (see below) and the still visible traces of destroyed photos on the tombs suggest that even in this military-
controlled place the Cultural Revolution “destroy the Four Olds” campaign did not spare those foreign “martyrs’” 
tombs, although the military subsequently sealed the place off to further damage. Cf. the brief, cautious hint in Ma 
Dianwen (2015), p. 20, citing a cemetery staff member. 
211
 See Dalianshi Zhongshanqu dangshi bangongshi 大连市中山区党史办公事 (ed.): Zhongshan nianjian 2011 中
山年鉴 2011 (“Zhongshan Yearbook” 2011), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2011, p. 86. 
212
 The “martyrs”, i.e. the casualties of the 1945 “August Storm”, were moved to this already existing Russian 
cemetery from the battle sites to the north of Dalian, since Dalian itself – as Harbin – was no site of armed conflict. 
Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 23. I am grateful to a local history professor for helping me get access to the usually 
closed-off Qingyunjie cemetery. 
213
 Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 24. 
214
 E.g., there are single English, Greek and German tombs to be found. According to the Dalian gazetteer on 
religion, the Orthodox community comprised at their best times 2.355 people, including besides Russia and Belarus 
also people from Germany, Czechia, Greece and China (mostly of mixed decent). See Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi 
(2002), p. 169. 




Dalian Gazetteer on Religion stated in 2002, the tsarist tombs amount to 69, of which 8 are 
collective tombs, many hosting navy sailors who died on sea and were transferred here.
215
 An 
earlier description of the tsarist/émigré part is given in the already named 1938 Russian 
publication from Harbin, “Forgotten Graves”, which took stock of Russian military cemeteries in 
Manchuria at that time with photos,
216
 based on a first Russian survey after the Russo-Japanese 
war, led by Golubev and Bolkhovitinov, and a subsequent commission led by General 
Dobronravov before WW I to organize an appropriate commemoration of the fallen soldiers in 
the Boxer War and the Russo-Japanese War from the Tsar’s side.217 According to that source, in 
1938 the cemetery had over 300 graves, had first been mostly for civilians and out of town, but 
by then was already in the midst of the urbanized area. Two large crosses still in place were 
dedicated to mass graves, one of them for the casualties of the minelayer Enisey sunk early in 
1904 by one of its own mines off Dalian [ill. 35].
218
 One of the more prominent civilians is 
Feliks Briner, son of a rich Swiss entrepreneur in Vladivostok and uncle of the Hollywood actor 




After the October Revolution the maintenance of the cemetery had been organized locally with 
the help of the Orthodox Church, but the establishment of Manchukuo and the changing Soviet-
Japanese relations with the transfer of the railway rights to the Japanese in 1935 necessitated the 
creation of a Board of Trustees under émigré General Mikhail Khanzhin who had fought already 
in the Russo-Japanese War. This board which looked also after the other Russian cemeteries in 
the area was thus established in 1935.
220
 The list of the present Russian Ministry of Defense, 
signed in 2018, gives a total of 930 people of which 585 are unknown ones of the Russo-
Japanese War, while of the 345 known ones originally identified by war veteran Ivanov et al. in 
1996 when touring China to take stock of Soviet memorials and tombs in China, 40 are of 1945, 
112 of the year 1946 and 178 of the years 1947-1949. The final 15 were after 1949.
221
 The 
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 Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 176. 
216
 Zabytyya mogily (1938). 
217
 See Aleksandr Koval‘s lecture of 2005 at the Elagin lecture series on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the 
Russo-Japanese War: “Rossiyskie memorialy Russko-Yaponskoy voyny v Kitae” (Russian memorials of the Russo-
Japanese War in China). Available online: https://rgavmf.ru/books/elaginskie-chteniya/elaginskie-chteniya-2005/ 
koval-ai-rossiyskie-memorialy-russko-yaponskoy. 
218
 For the minelayer Enisey, cf. http://www.navypedia.org/ships/russia/ru_ms_amur01.htm. See also Kowner: 
Historical Dictionary… (2006), pp. 112-113. For an old photo of the tomb, see the illustration part of Zabytyya 
mogily (1938). 
219
 Cf. the news report of Natal‘ya Shemetova in Komsomol’ckaya Pravda, September 15, 2015, available online: 
https://www.kp.by/daily/26429/3304735/. For more background of the influential Brynner family, including also 
some details on Feliks Briner (as he is spelt on the tomb and who was buried near Anna Timofeevna Blagovidova, 
apparently his mother-in-law who had died in 1936), see the colorful family portrait by Yul’s son Rock Brynner: 
Empire & Odyssey: the Brynners in Far East Russia and Beyond, Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press 2006. 
220
 Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 26. 
221
 See https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=1155162666. The Soviet known ones are taken over from Ivanov 
et al. (1997), pp. 72-81, who had published the results of their survey in 1997. This is surprising insofar as the 
mentioned on-spot plaque of 2009 had more “Soviet” tombs (371 military plus 54 family member graves). It is not 




Russian Ministry of Defense which drew up lists of the buried, at first detailed 257 Soviet tombs 
for the Qingyunjie Cemetery, but other lists provide 345 or 346 names (which is in any case less 
than the 371 Soviet military tombs given on the on-spot plaque).
222
 These are all military dead of 
1945-1950, including some 5 females belonging to the military. In this, all pre-1945 civilian 
individual tombs are not even addressed, concentrating on the military. This should be borne in 
mind when using figures of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s memorial website. The 
Qingyunjie cemetery is today managed by the Dalian municipal Civil Affairs Bureau.
223
 
However, the Chechen-Russian Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation was allowed to finance a 
restoration effort in 2015.
224
 This was done at the request of the Russian Club in Dalian, and the 
ceremony after the completion was attended also by the Russian ambassador to China and the 
Russian consul in Shenyang 沈阳 who serves the three northeastern provinces of China today.225 
It is highly probable that this was connected to a Russian national program to specifically care 
for Russian/Soviet military tombs abroad, 2011-2015, not the least prompted by Eastern 
European moves to “liberate” themselves of Soviet “liberator” memorials (see below).226 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quite clear why the website provides less, based on the older 1997 figures. Strangely, the Ministry has also rivalling 
listings on its website (see below). 
222
 See the alternative list of the Qingyunjie Cemetery on the Ministry’s memorial website: https://obd-
memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262075557&p=3. The list is not dated. There is a further list with 346 entries of the 
Ministry, the cemetery given as “Qinyuananjie” in Dalian: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262080028 
&p=1 of 2001. The newest of, again, correctly Qingyunjie, is the named one signed recently: https://obd-
memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id= 1155162666. Here the date of signatures by representatives of the Russian embassy 
in China as well as the Ministry of Defense is June 15, 2018 (like for those of Jinzhou and Lüshun, see below). The 
list itself, though, is still that of Ivanov et al. (1997), pp. 72-81. To complete the picture, it might be mentioned that 
the district gazetteer of 2002 even mentioned 385 Red Army tombs among a total of 488, receiving municipal funds 
for restoration in 1987. (See Dalianshi Zhongshanqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 大连市中山区地方志编纂委
员会 (ed.): Zhongshan quzhi 中山区志 (Zhongshan district gazetteer), Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe 2002, p. 362.)   
This shows figures diverge among the sources. 
223
 See the on-spot stone sign. 
224
 See the latter’s on-spot stone plaque. Akhmat Kadyrov was a Chechen mufti who in the 1990s first fought against 
the Russians but then collaborated with the Kremlin, which made him a target of Islamist terror. He was killed 2004 
by a bomb during the celebrations of Victory Day, i.e. the end of the Second World War, with his son Ramzan 
Kadyrov succeeding him as head of the Chechen Republic. This son is named as having supported the restoration of 
the Dalian Qingyun Street Cemetery together with the Foundation he set up in the name of his father, who is notably 
called a “Russian” hero. The Foundation has been criticized as somewhat dubious in several media, but has funded 
various projects also outside of Chechnya or elsewhere in Russia. According to the Dalian Russian Club, the 
argument used to convince the foundation to support the restoration were the roughly 30 tombs of people from the 
Caucasus. (See the news report by Natal’ya Shemetova in Komsomol’ckaya Pravda, September 15, 2015, available 
online: https://www.kp.by/daily/26429/3304735/). 
225
 See the report by Sergey Eryomin: “V Dalyane torzhestvenno otkryli otrestavrirovannoe russkoe voinskoe 
kladbishche” (The restored Russian military cemetery was solemnly opened in Dalian). September 24, 2015(b). 
Available online: http://pravfond.ru/?module=articles&action=view&id=1494. 
226
 These Soviet-critical movements were received by Russia as anti-Russian and as attempts to “rewrite history”, 
questioning the “liberating” role of the Soviet Red Army, especially in Estonia, but also elsewhere in the Baltic 
States and Eastern Europe where the memorials were now seen as signs of oppression.  




As the numbers of the listed identified graves show, the tombs are mostly of the second half of 
the 1940s, i.e. after the “August Storm of 1945” and thus, technically speaking, not of “martyrs” 
in the Chinese sense, while earlier tombs often are of sailors, including Western ones of 
“commercial” ships [ill. 37]. Typically, the original photos on the tombstones have disappeared. 
While the lower-level Soviet part of the cemetery where tombs connected to the military are 
located is kept very tidy, the part more up-hill with crosses where civil and also tsarist tombs are 
to be found with only occasional red starred Soviet tombs in between, is rather left to nature. The 
area is on two hills, one of which had an orthodox church dedicated to archangel Michael 
built,
227
 now erased because of the Cultural Revolution.
228
 A chapel had first been erected around 
1902 when the city of Dalian was still under construction. After the Russo-Japanese War, the 
now Japanese authorities offered it to the Japanese Orthodox Church, but by 1909 it was again 
in Russian hands, administered by the Beijing Ecclesiastical Mission.
229
 In 1912 it was renovated 
on the order of the tsarist mission to look after the Russian military tombs in Manchuria.
230
 Later, 
Japanese Orthodox priest Suzuki administered it.
231
 The chapel was expanded in the late 1920s 




Nearby the place where the church had been, there are today also tombs of orthodox priests,
233
 
most notably of Marin Korovin [ill. 38], sometimes called the “last Russian” (actually Belarusian) 
priest of the Mikhailovsky church (presumably since the follower cancelled the alignment with 
ROCOR to join the Moscow Patriarchate and thus would not “count” for some Orthodox) who 
served there during his last years up to his death in 1953, having served at Harbin’s Iveron 
church before.
234
 His tombstone, though broken, had been found by his relatives subsequently, 
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 For some old photos, see the illustration part of Zabytyya mogily (1938). See also http://www.orthodox.cn/ 
localchurch/liaoning/dalian/archangelmichael_en.htm. 
228
 Some sources speak of 1902 as the founding of the chapel which was later enlarged to a church. The gazetteer on 
religion dates the chapel to 1912. (Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 164, stating also that in 1902 there were 
plans which, however, could not be realized because of the Russo-Japanese War.) (See also ibid. p. 169.) However, 
the chapel must have existed earlier, given the discussion about who should administer it between the Russians and 
the Japanese. Formerly, this cemetery was named after the street name of the time, Jieshanjie 捷山街. 
229
 See Kharin (2014), p. 229. 
230
 Cf. S. S. Levoshko: “Church-monument of Archangel Michael. City of Dalian” Available online: http://www. 
orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/archangelmichael_en.htm. 
231
 Suzuki was first sent in 1915 to look after the Japanese Orthodox in the area and made Dalian again his “home-
base” in 1929. Cf. Kharin (2014), p. 230, and chapter 12. 
232
 According to Tatiana Erohina, her paternal grandfather, Fr. Mikhail [Erokhin], had been instrumental in bringing 
this about. He had, according to her (not always historically accurate) account, served at the church and was then 
assigned to the Philippines and finally to California. See Tatiana Erohina: Growing Up Russian in China: A 
Historical Memoir, Bloomington: iUniverse 2011, p. 5. Tatiana’s father (and son of Fr. Mikhail) is buried in the 
Qingyunjie cemetery. For a photo of the tomb of 1954 vs. one taken in 1988 as well as of the church and Fr. Mikhail, 
see ibid., illustration sheets. 
233
 Unfortunately, during my visit it was not possible to get closer to this section. 
234
 According to his relatives, he served in Dalian his last 10 years, as a long-term Russian resident of Dalian was 
told: see L. V. Sazanova (Voronova): “The Gleaming Light of the Past” (2004). Available online: http://www. 
orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/lightfrompast_en.htm. However, according to the Dalian gazetteer on 




and thus was restored by them in the 1990s.
235
 He was in fact the third non-Asian priest serving 
the church. Before him, the serving priest had gone back in 1947 to the Soviet Union (as would 
the one after him in 1954 and a nun who cared in the subsequent interim phase who went back in 
1956, before the church came into Chinese hands). Priest Zhu Shipu then cared for the 
Mikhailovsky church who subsequently would take over the Harbin diocese (see above). The 
first non-Asian priest prior to Korovin, however, who was buried as well in Dalian, had died 
apparently suddenly in 1940: Petr Rozhdestvensky.
236
 He was of Belarusian descent and 
decidedly anti-Soviet, having served in the White Army as a military chaplain and later most of 
the time in Harbin. He, too, was de facto buried in this cemetery which was seen as a Belarusian 
cemetery, being in the hands of Soviet-critical “White” clergy. (This might also explain why the 
Soviets rather opted for having their own church built at the former Shintô shrine location during 
their stay in Lüda – see below). The tomb of this earlier priest seems to be largely neglected. In 
1958 after the establishment of the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church and thus the end of 
the former Orthodox administration, all possessions of the Orthodox, including the religious 
buildings, were handed over in the Lüda area to the People’s Committee of Lüda, but were at 
first still open for the Chinese Orthodox to use.
237
 In 1964, a telling memorandum of the Dalian 
bureau of religion appealed to the higher administrative levels to help the Orthodox which had 
funding problems, also mentioning that the destruction of tombs should be stopped, and two 
housing buildings meanwhile constructed on the cemetery’s grounds should be removed! But 
already two years later with the Cultural Revolution, the church was destroyed and religious 
activities stopped altogether.
238
 On the spot where the church had been, an administrative 
building was erected instead.
239
 Notably, for the Soviet Red Army and their families, in 1947 a 
separate church had been built on the spot where the Japanese had their main Shintô Shrine 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
religion, he was the third of five acting priests there, the second having returned to the Soviet Union in 1947 which 
would suggest he took over responsibility only in 1947 to 1953. 
235
 See L. V. Sazanova (2004) who had contacted the relatives who provided also a brief biography: http:// 
www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/lightfrompast_en.htm. For a then-and later photo contrast of the tomb, 
see: http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/liaoning/dalian/archangelmichael_en.htm. In the meantime, a cross has 
been added. 
236
 For the priests serving at the Archangel St. Michael’s Church, see the Dalian gazetteer on religion (2002), p. 175. 
There was also some lower-level staff serving at the church. The first priest given by this Chinese source (in 
transliteration characters) can be identified as Petr Rozhdestvensky who died in 1940. See his biography available 
online: https://drevo-info.ru/articles/13676395.html. According to this orthodox website, though, there was father 
Gavriil Ogorodnikov for one year before him, i.e. since 1935. See https://drevo-info.ru/articles/14656.html. 
According to the Dalian religious gazetteer, Father Gavriil was however the second and returned to the Soviet Union 
in 1947. In Kharin (2014, chapter 12) it is stated that the Japanese priest Suzuki returned to Dalian in 1929 for 
serving the Japanese Orthodox to set up a prayer house for them, but also served at the cemetery chapel (i.e. the 
Mikhailovsky chapel) for Russians. In 1937 after the prayer house was built for the Japanese Orthodox in Dalian, he 
is said to have celebrated the opening together with Fr. Gavriil “from the Beijing diocese”. (When Suzuki himself 
died in 1946, his funeral was attended almost exclusively by Russians since the Japanese faithful had left.) (Ibid. p. 
310). 
237
 It had been the priest Zhu Shipu (cf. above for his role in Harbin) who had struck the deal with the city 
government. See the Dalian gazetteer of religion: Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 165. 
238
 See the Dalian gazetteer on religion, p. 165. 
239
 See the already cited 2004 description by a former Russian resident of Dalian, L. V. Sazanova: http://www. 
orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/lightfrompast_en.htm. 




before, not very far from the cemetery: the Aleksandr Nevsky church, which was however closed 
in 1955 when the Soviets left.
240
 When in 1964 an official list of Orthodox believers was set up, 
it amounted only to 35, 11 of which were non-Chinese; and in 1985, after the Cultural 




The second Russian cemetery in the area, located on Nanshan (southern hill) near the old once-
walled city of Jinzhou where the Japanese landed during the Russo-Japanese War to cut off the 
southern part of the peninsula at the neck-hole, now part of Dalian municipality with a new 
“special experimental zone” to the east of the old settlement, was set up originally for the 
Russian casualties of the war with Japan. It was the Japanese who had collected the Russian dead 
after the 1904 battle of Nanshan for burial, but the fact that close-by the Japanese memorial to 
their costly conquest and the one to the death of General Nogi’s son (today erased) obviously had 
necessitated barbed wire to protect the Russian crosses, bespeaks the more tense relationship in 
the commemoration in Jinzhou after the Russo-Japanese war.
242
 Today, the cemetery still hosts a 
collective memorial to the Russian casualties of the Russo-Japanese War, and these figure in the 
lists of the Russian Ministry of Defense today as 1.403 unknown of the 2.227 in total listed for 
the whole cemetery. This Russo-Japanese War cemetery was reused when the Soviets came into 
the area in 1945 to stay until 1955,
243
 and the 824 known burials in that cemetery of this time of 
Soviet presence comprise casualties of 1945,
244
 while the majority died after this up to 1955,
245
 
including casualties of the Korean War, but also some 7 females connected to the military.
246
 
The cemetery, first called “Nanshan Russian Military Cemetery” by the Chinese, was declared as 
“Soviet Martyrs’ cemetery” in 1953,247 and the present memorial stele in front of the gate (a 
Jinzhou district monument since 1957) was transferred there from the former railway station 
                                                          
240
 See the Dalian gazetteer on religion (2002), p. 171. 
241
 See the Dalian gazetteer on religion (2002), pp. 172-173 and p. 177. 
242
 Cf. the 1938 account of the cemetery’s state in Zabytyya mogily (1938), pp. 48-49. I am grateful to Fr. Andrey 
Bukhteev for letting me participate in a ceremony at the cemetery and guiding me to the place the Japanese stele 
once stood. 
243
 In Jinzhou, the Soviets stationed the 39th army, i.e. the people buried in those years up to 1955 were usually of 
this army. 
244
 Again, also Jinzhou was not itself a site of battles. Thus, the dead were transferred there from the battles further 
to the north. Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 36. 
245
 As it seems from the lists, the last burials were de facto in 1954. 
246
 See the list of the Jinzhou Cemetery on the Ministry’s memorial website: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm? 
id=1155161807&p=1. The list is signed in 2018 and for the “41 Soviet casualties of 1945” bases itself on Ivanov et 
al. who provided a list in 1997 (see there pp. 189-190.) It seems the data on the casualties of 1946 (3 of them listed 
already by Ivanov et al., though) to 1955 were collected only later, as part of the Ministry’s list is declared as based 
on the state found in 2007. However, comparing the lists of the Ministry and of Ivanov et al., several of Ivanov et 
al.’s names were corrected with death dates after 1945, while other 1945 dead were individuated which did not 
appear in Ivanov et al. Thus, de facto the Ministry’s list has only 32 people who died in 1945 which means these are 
the potential casualties of fighting with the Japanese, i.e. “martyrs” in the Chinese sense, together with the Korean 
War casualties. 
247
 See Dalianshi Jinzhouqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi 大连市金州区地方志编纂委员会办公室: 
Jinxianzhi 金县志 (Jin county gazetteer), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 1989, p. 536. 




location in 2004 [ill. 39].
248
 This was that stele’s second “move” since it had originally been built 
by the Soviets on Dalian’s big square in front of the city government in 1946 (to be named 
“Stalin Square in 1947)249 as a “victory stele” and was “moved” from there (actually rebuilt and 
renamed as a memorial stele to the “Soviet Red Army Martyrs”) to Jinzhou’s railway station in 
1953-1955 to make room for a new stele on Dalian’s Stalin Square in honor of the “Soviet Red 
Army Martyrs” there.250 In Russian parlance, again the cemetery is just called “Soviet Military 
Cemetery” (without “Martyrs”). 
 
The Jinzhou cemetery [ill. 40] clearly differentiates between the Soviets and the (in Chinese eyes 
problematic) tsarist casualties, marking the latter off with a wall [ill. 41]. These are only 
collectively remembered, mainly by the monument installed by the tsarist delegation after the 
Russo-Japanese war. A Sino-Russian plaque of 2016 states that the cemetery was restored 2013-
2015 with “Russian money”, though not giving any foundation in this case. In fact, the Russian 
Ministry of Defense had obviously sponsored it.
251
 Notably, here the tombs are only numbered as 
673, “hosting” “over 1000” Soviet “martyrs”/“heroes” (glossing over the existence of Russo-
Japanese War casualties there, but also not explicitly addressing the family members of the 
Soviet military which might explain the difference in numbers with the Russian Ministry of 
Defense’s list). The Soviet “martyrs”/“heroes” include also a few aviators [ill. 42], although most 
of the air force casualties of the Korean War are buried in Lüshun (see below). Apart from 
individual tombs which at times show the military unit [ill. 43], the cemetery also has several 
newly set-up memorial bronze-color wreaths with plaques of names which obviously have been 
found in lists but do not correspond to any remains [ill. 44], ordered according to rank. 
Interestingly, the original list of “martyrs”, intending those who died during the “liberation” of 
Manchuria from the Japanese in 1945 and were transferred there, was drawn up by the Chinese 
in 1971 during the Cultural Revolution!
252
 It provided only names but no ranks, to the chagrin of 
the Russians who based themselves on this list when they took stock of Soviet tombs in China in 
the mid-1990s. Obviously in the context of the 2007 accord between China and Russia on the 
maintenance of Soviet tombs, the Russian Ministry of Defense made a more intensive on-spot 
investigation to draw up lists of its own.
253
 This then served as a basis for the recent renovation 
efforts. 
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 See Cui Shihao (2007), p. 211. 
249
 See Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 30. 
250
 See Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 37-39 and p. 217 on the Jinzhou stele, and pp. 30-34 on the later one on Dalian’s 
Stalin Square (which then was moved to the Lüshun cemetery where it is now – see below). 
251
 This assumption has been confirmed by Fr. Bukhteev. Personal communication May 20, 2019. 
252
 See Ivanov et al. (1997), p. 188, footnote. It might be mentioned that the foreign policy implications were never 
absent, even during the Cultural Revolution, which led to the call to differentiate between “types” of people and to at 
least keep records, though this was not always heeded in practice. Cf. Müller (2018a), pp. 21-22 . 
253
 See the already referred-to list of the Ministry’s memorial website, p. 14, which explains that the second part of 
its present list had been drawn up according to the tombstone inscriptions found in situ in 2007. 




The final and largest Russian cemetery is the one in Lüshun [ill. 45]. In China, it is commonly 
referred to as the “largest foreigners’ cemetery on Chinese soil”.254 The Russian Ministry of 
Defense lists 314 military burials (for the time 1945-1955), though Lüshun itself, like the whole 
Dalian area, at these times did not live through military confrontation.
255
 This means, the 
cemetery rather functioned as a central burial place for Soviet military staff dying in the larger 
region, most notably including also 202 pilots that clandestinely participated in and died during 
the Korean War (1950-1953). The Soviet Union did not officially enter the Korean War for fear 
of setting off a new world war (which also made the US turn a blind eye to Soviet involvement), 
but sent war material and, above all, experienced aviators to help the North Korean/Chinese side. 
Because of this situation, the tombs of the fallen Soviet aviators who were allowed to only fight 
not too far into North Korean territory to make sure they could be transferred back, and in 
consequence the whole cemetery had to be kept secret during Cold War times.
256
 The Soviet 
pilots are a special group with tombstones featuring small airplanes [ill. 46].
257
 They include also 
some “heroes of the Soviet Union”. As for the Soviets in all, unsurprisingly the largest group 
(52%) were lower and middle rank in the military, while the officers made up 17,4%. The list of 
the Ministry of Defense also shows that some 11 females attached to the military were buried 
there in the time of the Soviet presence. These included, e.g., hospital nurses.
258
 But beyond the 
active military, already during the preceding years of blockade of the Dalian-Lüshun area during 
the Chinese Civil War (1946-49) there were many, not the least children of Red Army families, 
who died of diseases [ill. 47], augmented by the rather poor sanitary conditions. One of the main 
problems for smaller children was encephalitis transmitted by mosquitos, until a vaccine was 
developed. Thus, the high rate of 23,3% of children’s burials can be explained.259 But also 
further family members who died during the whole time of Soviet presence in Lüshun are to be 
found in the cemetery [ill. 48]. The children’s burials are focused in one area as are the other 
civilians, thus showing an on-principle zoning approach to the burial spaces. 
 
However, the bulk of the burials in the Lüshun cemetery are of earlier times. Already during the 
very first Russian presence around the turn of the 20th century there and given that the place was 
used by the Japanese after winning the war against Russia for centrally burying the Russian dead, 
there were numbers reported in 1907 that amounted to 14.873 Russian military dead plus some 
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 See, e.g., Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 2. 
255
 See the list of the Lüshun Cemetery of the Ministry of Defense’s memorial website: https://obd-memorial.ru/ 
html/info.htm?id=262079951. The list seems to be of 2018 but is obviously based on Koval’s 2011 booklet (see 
below). 
256
 Cf. Ma Dianwan (2015), p. 17. The 202 dead aviators, however, were not all of the shot-down Soviet aviators, 
since 345 airplanes were lost. See Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 26-27. 
257
 For a list of all military staff that died 1950-1953 and are buried in the cemetery (over 300), see the survey by 
Ivanov et al., published 1997, based on the archives of the Ministry of Defense: there pp. 253-262. There is a special 
memorial to the aviators who “died for Stalin”. (Cf. [ill. 46], highest memorial with wreath and flowers.) 
258
 See, i.a., the example given by Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 22.  
259
 Koval (2011, see below), p. 83, provides the different percentages. 




family members or other civilians, in total around 16.600 buried there, many of the military staff 
in mass graves without individual information.
260
 The cemetery thus has basically two parts 
today: the front (Eastern) part for the Soviets [ill. 49], and the rear (Western) part where 
originally the entrance had been (now a closed side entrance) for the tsarist ones. It should be 
noted, that there are also a few Jewish tombs in a tiny extra section [ill. 50], and very few civilian 
“Western European” tombs as well [ill. 51], though not all placed together.261 The most detailed 
listing of tombstones has been done by Aleksandr Koval together with Zhang Daxian (see below). 
They listed every tombstone, and Koval published it in Moscow to make it also possible for 
Russians to find their relatives’ tombs. Koval and Zhang found 1.845 personal tombs: 529 from 
the time of 1898-1945, and 1.316 of the 1945-1955 period.
262
 All in all, Koval concluded there 
were 15.131 burials between 1898 and 1935, and 2.045 in the Soviet period 1945-1955, bringing 
the total to 17.176.
263
 Of the earlier times, apart from the main group of Russo-Japanese War 
casualties, he found 26 dead when defending the Railway in 1900-1901, i.e. against the Boxers; 
and 9 foreigners (which included also children), according to Koval employees of a German 




In those very first years there were, in fact, also several civilians.
265
 While some early civil 
burials were simply behind the railway station,
266
 the Russians started to use the present location 
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 See Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 24. 
261
 According to Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 35, there were 14 Jews originally, separated by a line of thujas. Today, 
the most eye-catching Jewish tombstone is of a young woman who died in 1901 (and according to the tombstone 
was from then-Austrian Tarnopol – now Ternopil in the Ukraine: strangely her non-Russian Austrian nationality is 
not addressed in any available source). Apart from the number of Jews, Zabytyya mogily gives 7 Germans and 3 
Danes. The latter could additionally explain why also a Protestant pastor was invited to join the reopening after 
restoration by the Russians in 2010 though he seems to not have been on spot but was interviewed by the Russian 
TV elsewhere (cf. the short youtube news video, available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41ayvVvfbjk). 
Of course, there have likely been also “Russian” Protestants present in the tsarist army. Koval (2011, see below), 
though, found only 7 “Western” names in his survey which seem to include the 3 Danes, but less Germans, all 
having died between 1899 and 1917, i.e. during tsarist times, and obviously civilians. 
262
 A[leksandr] Koval: Port-Artur: Voinsky memorial Rossii. Kniga pamyati (Russian war memorial: Memory Book), 
Moscow: ID “Forum” 2011: p. 23. I am grateful to Prof. Zhang Daxian for sharing the booklet with me and for 
visiting the cemetery together. 
263
 See Koval (2011: p. 83). 
264
 Cf. Koval (2011), p. 8 and p. 83. As noted above, in terms of (non-Cyrillic) “Western” names, he, however, 
provides only 7 (p. 82). 
265
 See the list on the Ministry of Defense’s memorial website: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id= 
1155160573&p=4.  
266
 For a photo said to be of the civilian burial of engineer Vladimir V. Sakharov, main planner of Vladivostok, of 
Dal’ny (Dalian) and first mayor of this nascent city, and planner of Lüshun’s defense architecture who died during 
the Russo-Japanese War of illness (not listed by the Ministry of Defense’s website or in Koval’s 2011 booklet, thus 
obviously in the other cemetery that was set up behind the railway station), see Lüshun tushi (2012), p. 69. It should 
be mentioned that Sakharov was portrayed negatively as a traitor in Aleksandr Stepanov’s very influential historical 
novel Port Arthur. (A. Stepanov: Port Arthur: A Historical Narrative, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House 1947). He apparently was ordered to destroy the port facilities of Dal’ny as much as possible when retreating 
with the Russian population from there to Port Arthur before the advancing Japanese, though the damage inflicted 




since 1898 [ill. 52], mainly designed for the military, above all the navy. The Orthodox Church 
cared for the burials, which became ever more frequent after the start of the Russo-Japanese 
War.
267
 Only outstanding figures like General Roman Kondratenko who was a key figure in the 
months-long defense of Lüshun against the Japanese and was killed by them during the war, 
were transferred back to St. Petersburg for burial.
268
 Although there are still several individual 
tombs of 1904/05 in the cemetery which had been set up by the Russians as long as they held 
Port Arthur, most of the war casualties were buried there only later after the Japanese had 
conquered Lüshun and transferred most dead Russians there.  
 
When the Japanese buried the Russian casualties of the Russo-Japanese War afterwards to 
demonstrate to the world that they knew how to treat dead foes respectfully in a “civilized” way, 
they did so centrally, since the Russian fallen soldiers had first been buried on spot at 28 
different battle fields.
269
 Now they were grouped together and centralized at the cemetery, with 
the Japanese fallen with their own cemetery near-by, though.
270
 While burying the Russians, the 
Japanese differentiated between sailors and soldiers who were interred usually nameless with 
smaller iron crosses [ill. 53], and the officers who received marble crosses [ill. 54].
271
 The mass 
graves of transferred casualties from particular battle sites beyond Port Arthur were grouped 
together with large elegant marble crosses [ill. 55],
272
 close to the impressive European classical 
temple-like mausoleum which the Japanese built after the war as an eye-catching sight of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was only minor, sometimes said to be due to time pressure. In any case, the Dal’ny port served the Japanese well 
during the war. 
267
 For an oft-reprinted 1905 colored photo with a priest looking after the war dead, see, e.g., Betsy C. Perabo: 
Russian Orthodoxy and the Russo-Japanese War, London et al.: Bloomsbury 2017, p. 149. At the time, the cemetery 
only had a small prayer hall. The chapel would be added years later in 1912 (see below). (See Dalianshi shizhi 
bangongshi 大连市史志办公室  (ed.): Dalianshi zhi. Minzuzhi, zongjiaozhi 大连市志。民族志，宗教志 
(Gazetteer of Dalian municipality: ethnic gazetteer, religious gazetteer). Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2002, 
religious gazetteer part, p. 164). The first burial at the present location was according to Koval a crew member of the 
navy. See Koval (2011), p. 4. 
268
 He was given a state funeral and buried, as already mentioned, in St. Petersburg’s Aleksandr Nevsky Monastery 
Cemetery where his tombstone is still standing, while the Japanese later put up a stone stele at the place where he 
had been killed. (Cf. Rotem Kowner: Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, Lanham: Scarecrow 2006, 
pp. 188-189). For a photo of the Japanese stele to Kondratenko, see the collection of old photographs in Dalian 
jiuying (“Old Fashions of Dalian”), Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe 2007, p. 57. 
269
 See Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 32. 
270
 According to Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 34, the Japanese military cemetery (now unsurprisingly not extant any 
longer) was southeast of the Russian one. 
271
 Cf. Aleksandr Koval’s 2003 article “Voinsky memorial Rossii v Port-Arture” (Russian War memorial in Port 
Arthur). In: Problemy  Dal’nego Vostoka (Problems of the Far East) 2003, no. 4, pp. 158-165. For some old photos, 
see Lüshun tushi  (2012), part 4.  
272
 Given the high numbers of hundreds and thousands, it may be assumed that the Japanese followed their own 
custom and cremated the bodies before burial. Theoretically, though, there were orders to only cremate the Japanese 
but give the Russians their customary earth burials. Cf. Tino Schölz: “Die Gefallenen besänftigen und ihre Taten 
rühmen”. Gefallenenkult und politische Verfasstheit in Japan seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (“To appease the 
fallen and to glorify their deeds”: The Cult of the Fallen and the political constitution in Japan since the mid-19th 
century), Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2016, p. 173. 




“generous” collective remembrance of the defeated [ill. 56], where they staged the pompous 
opening of the cemetery, inviting Russian representatives to participate. All in all, there were 




The Japanese builders of the cemetery, though, complicate the “cultural-religious” connection, 
and the relationship to the Orthodox Church was fairly complicated, too. Officially, the Beijing 
Ecclesiastical Mission was responsible for Russian cemeteries in Lüshun. Since the Russian 
Orthodox Church had also a mission in Japan led by the Russian Bishop (later Archbishop) 
Nikolay (Kasatkin), better known as “Nicholas of Japan”, who was understandably in a delicate 
position in Tokyo during the Russo-Japanese War,
274
 the Japanese Orthodox Church was now 
involved, too. On the other hand, for some Russians the fact that the Port Arthur Icon of the 
Triumph of the Theotokos (God-Bearer) did not reach its destination Lüshun in time to protect 
the Russians there was part of the reason of defeat. This icon had been drawn upon a vision of a 
sailor in Kiev in 1903 before the outbreak of the war which shows the Virgin Mary, holding a 
Mandylion, standing on two crossed broken swords with God Father and two angels above and a 
port in the background. According to the account of the visionary sailor, the icon should be made 
and brought to Port Arthur to protect the Russians in an upcoming war there from “paganism”. 
Otherwise, disaster would follow.
275
 The icon got stuck in Vladivostok, and after the war’s end 
would certainly have created tensions with the victorious Japanese, had it been in place, because 
of its predicted “victory over paganism” (i.e. the “non-Christian” Japanese). From Vladivostok, 
in turn, the icon disappeared during the tumultuous times following the October Revolution and 
was said to have been rediscovered in Jerusalem in 1998.
276
 (During the recent restoration of the 




Back in 1908, when the Japanese had the “showcase” cemetery of Russians/foreigners officially 
opened, Russian Bishop Innokenty (Figurovsky) of the Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing was 
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 Cf., e.g., the eye-catching monument with an angel of an Ekaterina [ill. 57] said to have been the prototype of the 
nurse Varya in Aleksandr Stepanov’s famous Soviet-era novel on the defense of Port Arthur (Stepanov 1947). For a 
photo comparison of the tomb before and after the restoration, see Kirill Elizarov’s (see below) presentation of the 
restoration project on youtube (2011):  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= bLAX31 SfVo0&t=125s, min. 2:29. 
274
 For more on the complicated relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church, Japan and Lüshun, and how this 
played into issues of theological positions on warfare, see Betsy Perabo (2017), chapters  6-9. 
275
 See Perabo 2017, pp. 81-82, pp. 132-133, p. 148. P. 81 shows the icon. 
276
 On this see the church broadcast: “Port-Arturskaya ikona. 1998 g. Ierusalim-Vladivostok” (Port Arthur icon. 
1998. Jerusalem-Vladivostok). Available online: https://rutube.ru/video/ce95d58ed6b66d0aa2c175dcd180081f/. 
277
 According to the e-book Port Arthur, p. 57, a consecrated copy was made and placed at the end of the restoration 
work in the chapel at the cemetery, which is, however, usually closed. (The e-book is accessible as a pdf file via: 
http://www.funcommunications.com/public-relations/port-arthur.) For a Russian news report of the placing of the 
copy in the chapel in December 2010, see “Spisok Port-Arturskoy ikony Bozhiey Materi ustanovlen v chasovne na 
russkom kladbishche v Port-Arture” (Roll of the Port Arthur Icon of the Mother of God installed in the chapel at the 
Russian cemetery in Port Arthur). Available online: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1338007.html. For a photo of 
the icon inside the chapel, see http://www.orthodox.cn/images/20110831lushuncemetery.jpg. 




present as a guest.
278
 In 1912 the Russian government asked the Japanese authorities for being 
allowed to set up a huge white marble cross (as they did elsewhere in cemeteries)
279
 as the center 
of the cemetery to honor their own dead after Tsar Nicholas II had decreed that the military 
cemeteries in the Far East should be taken care of now also from the Russian side [ill. 58]. 
Furthermore, the Russians requested to be allowed to set up a chapel dedicated to St. Equal-to-
the-apostles Vladimir, which, however, remained very small, probably to not visually challenge 
the Japanese-built mausoleum.
280
 At the time the Russians put forward their request, Japan had 
been firmly established in Lüshun anyway and in fact was looking for a new rapprochement with 
Russia. It thus seems that the cemetery was put to use for diplomatic agendas. On the huge cross 
built by the Russians, an icon of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker had been placed (which was, 
according to the recent restoration project, destroyed during the Cultural Revolution). In 1913, 
remains of six further Russo-Japanese War casualties were added to the cemetery when the 
Japanese located the wreck of the former Russian flagship Petropavlovsk sunk in the harbor. 
They claimed the remains to include those of Admiral Makarov, the commander, and those of 
well-known painter Vereshchagin, and buried the bones in the cemetery with great fanfare and a 
guard of honor, though the claims remain unascertained as the sinking of the flagship entailed 
around 700 casualties with only few survivors, and there was no way to decide whether the 
bones rescued after almost a decade in the sea included those of the two “VIPs”.281 Makarov’s 
coat, however, had been found floating in the water after the Petropavlovsk had sunk in 1904 and 
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 Ibid. For a critical essayistic treatment of the cemetery and its political “uses”, see local Chinese female writer 
Susu 素素 (Wang Suying 王素英): Lüshunkou wangshi 旅顺口往事 (The past of Lüshunkou), Beijing: Zuojia 
chubanshe 2012, pp. 379-397. The opening in 1908 was reported also in the Western press at the time. See, e.g., the 
English version of a French report: “Japanese honor 15.000 Russian dead” in Popular Mechanics, vol. 10 (1908), pp. 
576-577. 
279
 For similar crosses, see the illustration part in Zabytyya mogily (1938), showing further examples in Manchuria. 
Since they have – as the one in Lüshun – a round filled with an icon on the upper part, one may assume that the one 
in Lüshun now void also had an icon in there once. In one case the icon on top can be identified as a Christ which 
means that maybe the plaque in Lüshun stating that there had been an original icon of Christ once on the cross might 
refer to this upper round, while the icon of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker was where it is also now. Apparently, the 
question of the existence or not of an icon of Christ had created some disputes in Russia during the recent restoration 
(see below). See “Port-Artur. Chuzhaya istoriya” (Port Arthur: strange history) (2010). Available online: https:// 
www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2010/11/10/762-port-artur-chuzhaya-istoriya. (For the on-spot reference to an 
original icon of Christ, cf. the photo of a plaque in the e-book Port Arthur p. 40, stating this.) 
280
 This, at least, is the assumption of architectural historian S.S. Levoshko: “Arkhitekturnye traditsii pamyati v 
pravoslavii: khramy- pamyatniki pavshim voinam na Dal'nem Vostoke (k 100-letiyu russko-yaponskoy voyny 1904-
1905 gg” (Architectural traditions of memory in Orthodoxy: sanctuary-monuments to fallen soldiers in the Far East 
(to the 100th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905). In: Makar'yevskiye chteniya : Materialy 
chetvertoy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii (21-22 noyabrya 2005 goda) (Macarius readings: Proceedings of the fourth 
international conference (November 21-22, 2005)), ed. by V.G. Babin. Gorno-Altaisk: RIO GAGU, 2005, 7 pages, 
there p. 5. Paper available online via the index page:  http://e-lib.gasu.ru/konf/mak/arhiv/2005/index.html. 
281
 Koval (2011), p. 8, for one, refutes the claim. 
282
 Cf. Levoshko (2005), p. 5. As noted above, Makarov remained a “hero” also during Soviet times. 




Whereas the care for the Russian war dead (and the occasional civilians who were now centrally 
buried in this “non-Asian cemetery” as well)283 was still officially shouldered by the Russian 
Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing with the help of the Japanese orthodox priest Sergey Suzuki 
stationed in Manchuria,
284
 in 1924, with the Sino-Soviet agreement of mutual recognition, this 
task was officially handed over to the local Dalian Orthodox Church. In 1928 the Soviets were 
assumed to take over responsibilities for the cemeteries, though this did not work well. Thus, in 
1935 the care for the cemetery had to be sustained again by the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of 
Beijing sending the Russian hieromonk Georgy there.
285
 Furthermore, one of the officers who 
had lived through the Russo-Japanese War, Major Vasil’ev, served together with “White” 
General Mikhail Khanzhin on the Board of Trustees for the Russian cemeteries in the whole 
Dalian-Lüshun area. Vasil’ev asked to be buried with his fallen comrades at his own demise, and 
thus in 1935 he was the last to be buried in the Lüshun cemetery before 1945.
286
 From 1936 
onward Russian general-turned-priest German (Isaev) served at the place who even held bees for 
honey and grew wine at the cemetery.
287
 During war time, the Japanese, however, insisted that 
the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of Beijing officially handed over all churches and cemeteries 
which the Beijing diocese previously had cared for in Manchuria to the Harbin diocese in 
Manchukuo.
288
 In fact, the situation in Manchuria was particularly complicated since on the one 
hand the Japanese Orthodox Church was looking after the Japanese faithful there, while 
theoretically, the Russians (often “stateless”) were in between the Harbin diocese in the North in 
Manchukuo, and Beijing which had traditionally cared for the cemeteries in the Dalian-Lüshun 
area. On the other, while the (“White”) émigrés in Manchuria, like the Beijing diocese up to the 
end of the war, were aligned with the anti-Soviet ROCOR synod, the Russian-born Metropolitan 
of Tokyo, Sergius (Tikhomirov), openly opted in 1931 to align the Japanese Orthodox Church 
with the Moscow Patriarchate, a move that led also to massive tensions in Japan and in the end 
forced him into retirement during the war.
289
 In southern Manchuria, it thus fell to Fr. Suzuki to 
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 According to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s statistic (based on Koval), there were 49 Russian burials in the 
time 1898-1935 which were neither related to the Boxer Uprising nor the Russo-Japanese War plus the 9 (Western) 
foreigners. Available online: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=1155160573&p=1. As mentioned, the 
Chinese and the Japanese were buried in other cemeteries. 
284
 Suzuki was mostly stationed as a priest in Shenyang (where he also looked after the Russian cemetery now 
erased) from where he cared also for the southern Liaodong peninsula. See Dalian gazetteer on religion Dalianshi 
zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 170. A photo of him (at the former tsarist cemetery in Shenyang/Mukden) can be found 
in the illustration part of Zabytyya mogily (1938). He was a student of Nicholas of Japan, served in Manchuria since 
1915, first in Dalian for the Japanese Orthodox, and died in Dalian in 1946. Cf. the online biography: https://drevo-
info.ru/articles/27190.html. For the delicate position of the Japanese Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the jurisdiction and 
properties issues in the area, see Kharin (2014), pp. 229-230. Suzuki would be the only Japanese priest to take care 
of the Russians there. (Ibid. and p. 223.)  
285
 See Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 26.  
286
 His photo on the tomb is – as several others – vandalized. To his side, the nurse who had cared for him and died 
in 1946 was buried, now enclosed together with a fence, though they were not married. 
287
 See Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 29. 
288
 See Kharin (2014), chapter 12. Archbishop Victor of Beijing had to sign a “lease” in 1942. 
289
 It might be briefly mentioned that Sergius had collected funds for reconstructing the Tokyo Cathedral destroyed 
during the Great Kantô Earthquake in 1923 from Russian émigrés in Manchuria. His pro-Moscow decision he made 
public only after the opening of the reconstructed cathedral in 1929, although he had privately established the 




handle the situation between the Japanese and the Russian Orthodox, looking after both groups 
when needed, until the Russian cemeteries were cared for by émigré clergy again.  
 
In August 1945, when the Soviet Red Army entered, they reportedly paid immediate tribute to 
their dead “compatriots”, suggesting the Soviet Union had now had made good for the tsarist 
failure of the Russo-Japanese war. The fallen of 1904/05 had died for “faith, Tsar and fatherland” 
but at a time when the political “problems” between the “Whites” and the “Reds” had not yet 
arisen. Thus, a commemoration was unproblematic in Soviet eyes. Since the name “Port Arthur” 
evoked in Russia the feeling of deep humiliation, the Soviet take-over was broadly perceived as a 
late revenge against the Japanese and a boost of national morale. Father German who had cared 
for the cemetery since a decade, though, was immediately arrested,
290
 and also General Khanzhin 
as a further “White” military who had, as mentioned, served on the Board of Trustees for this 
and the other Russian cemeteries in the Dalian-Lüshun area during the last years of the Japanese-




While at first the dead of the August 1945 campaigns which were transferred to Lüshun were 
buried in between the tsarist tombs, wherever there was space, later the Eastern part of the 
cemetery was newly added for the now stationed Red Army troops and their families and thus 
became the “Soviet part”.292  
 
In 1955 when the Soviets left, a Sino-Soviet memorial stele was built to remember the fallen in 
the fight against the Japanese for the “freedom and happiness of the Soviet and Chinese peoples”, 
which is central to the Soviet part of the cemetery [ill. 59]. It is flanked by two kneeling bronze 
statues with lowered flags and weapons designed by a Soviet sculptor who used soldiers as 
models: one of the army and one of the navy. This impressive arrangement was to leave a strong 
Russian visual legacy to the Chinese who now took over completely.
293
 On a much smaller and 
more personal scale, a Chinese dedication to one of the very last burials in 1955, an army 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contact already before. (Cf. Kharin 2014, p. 254). As a pro-Moscow foreigner, he was, on the other hand, suspected 
to be a Soviet spy in Japan. 
290
 According to the Dalian gazetteer on religion, Father German had left Lüshun in 1940 to serve at Manzhouli, a 
former White Army officer named Nikolay taking over, who would be shot by the Red Army in 1945: Dalianshi zhi. 
Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 178. Koval (2011, p. 9), though, states that Father German stayed up to 1945 and was then 
sent to a labor camp by the Soviets. His original name was Oleg Isaev, and his daughters had moved from Shanghai 
to overseas. (See http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/olegisaev_en.htm).  
291
 On General Khanzhin, see Jonathan D. Smele: Historical Dictionary of the Russian Civil Wars, 1916-1926. 
Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield 2015, p. 565-567. 
292
 This means that de facto the “tsarist part” also contains several Soviet tombs – an argument the Russians have 
tried to use in the last years to refute Chinese attempts to strictly differentiate between both parts. 
293
 Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 194-195. 




engineer [ill. 60], is a rare reminder that this Russian cemetery is located in China (and was from 
this point onward left in Chinese hands). 
 
At closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the whole issue of setting a large-scale renovation of 
this cemetery on track owes much to the dedication of several individuals, above all the already 
mentioned Aleksandr Koval, a former geographer, who had spent his youth in Lüshun while the 
Soviets were stationed there, worked for the Red Army himself later and had already authored a 
Russian article on the cemetery in 2003. He had come back to Lüshun twice on official guided 
visits for Soviet “veterans” whom he accompanied, possible since the mid-1990s; once in 1996 
and then in 2000.
294
 In 1996 he had noticed the rather dilapidated state, whereas in 2000 things in 
the Soviet part, which was only possible to officially visit, were renovated, e.g. with red stars in 
concrete put onto steles that had no longer their original (more valuable) metal ones.
295
 Since 
1988, however, the cemetery (intending the Soviet part) was officially protected by the Chinese 
under the heritage protection law of 1982 which meant it could at least not be erased.
296
 Due to 
the 1995 regulations of the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs on protection of memorials of 
revolutionary “martyrs”, these had not only to be protected but also integrated into “patriotic and 
internationalist” education. 297  In 1999 after consultations with Russia, the Ukraine and 
Belarus,
298
 the Dalian stele of 1953 with a huge Soviet soldier which had been damaged during 
the Cultural Revolution and was marked as protected heritage of Dalian in 1979,
299
 was 
transferred to the cemetery,
300
 thus “liberating” the Dalian “Stalin Square” which is now 
                                                          
294
 He came together with a group of veterans led by the head of the China section among Russian veterans, Vasily 
Ivanov, who visited Lüshun (and other places with Soviet cemeteries in China) in 1996 and 2000. (Cf. Tian Zhihe 
2010, p. 263). As mentioned, Ivanov et al. published the results of their survey of 1996 in 1997. There are some 
photos of the Lüshun cemetery’s Soviet part taken in 1996 (pp. 90-91 and pp. 242-246). They appear fairly tidy but 
might not have reflected the overall impression, since Koval complains of dilapidation. It should be borne in mind 
that such visits were always accompanied and “free photographing” was certainly not encouraged. 
295
 Koval (2003). According to Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 4, the renovation was undertaken in 1996, probably due to 
the complaints. As Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 214, notes, one of the problems for keeping the cemetery in good shape 
was the overlapping responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Culture, 
slowing down decisions. Whether the metal had gone for Great Leap Forward or other needs, is open to speculation. 
296
 This should be borne in mind as it did not mean that the place would be renovated; but it would at least be safe 
from bulldozing. Thus, the Russian claims (see below) that the Chinese had intended to erase the site in the 2000s, is 
unlikely or rather might have only affected the tsarist part which, technically speaking, is not to be protected in the 
Chinese point of view. 
297
 Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 210. 
298
 This shows Chinese awareness of the by now broader diplomatic implications after the end of the Soviet Union. 
See Dalianshi Lüshunkouqu shizhi bangongshi 大连市旅顺口区史志办公室 (ed.): Lüshunkou zhi zui 旅顺口之最 
(The best of Lüshunkou), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2011, p. 45. 
299
 An on-spot plaque displays the heritage status. In 2002, it was upgraded to a provincial-level heritage site. 
However, most sources do not mention that the soldier’s statue had been severely damaged during the Cultural 
Revolution, and thus he is now slimmer than originally, with a new foot and head and just one original medal that 
could be found again with two others substituted with replicas. Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 216, and Susu (2012), p. 
395. 
300
 For more on the crafting of the stele and the casting of the Soviet soldier figure in the 1950s, see Ma Dianwen 
(2015), pp. 7-10. Ma, though, does not mention the later damage. 




“People’s Square”, 301  evicting the Soviet statue from Chinese public space, 302  and thus 
“centralizing” Dalian’s Soviet legacy in Lüshun in a way. In the lower part, an exhibition is since 
2012 integrated into the stele’s basement.303 When in 2001 the former Russian president Yeltsin 
came to visit, and later Medvedev in 2006 (as vice premier) and in 2010 (as acting Russian 
president), the (Soviet) cemetery was presented in a good shape.
304
 After his earlier experiences, 
Koval, in turn, sought out Zhang Daxian, a member of the Dalian Russian choir who visited 
Russia in 2004 on a friendship tour, where both met. Discovering that they both had spent their 
youth in the Dalian-Lüshun area where Zhang Daxian was born, who then studied Russian and 
was later professor of Russian at the Liaoning Normal University, they decided to undertake a 
careful on-site listing. This they did in 2008, resulting in Koval’s booklet of 2011 which, as 
noted, only appeared in Russian and in Russia. As will become obvious in the following, this 
was probably due to the fact that the “real” entity behind the project was the Russian Ministry of 
Defense, and that the project also included the tsarist part. In any case, Koval and Zhang also 
arranged for various visits of Russian veterans and relatives which led to media reporting in 
Russia and China and even to a Chinese TV documentary in two parts in 2015 to honor the 70th 
anniversary of WW II’s end, based on Zhang Daxian’s last visit to Russia in 2014 shortly before 




Notably, on the Chinese side the whole story was framed coherently into one of a Chinese and a 
Russian (both active in Sino-Russian friendship activities) discovering their shared local 
experience in youth by chance and now paying tribute to the shared legacy between China and 
Russia/the Soviet Union by caring for the “Soviet martyrs’ cemetery”. The storyline suggests 
that it was the friendship tour of Zhang Daxian and the choir to Russia where he met Koval by 
chance, which set all on track, developing into a close personal friendship between the two who 
then discovered the site’s details together. Consequently, the fact, that Koval had been back to 
Lüshun already twice before, was deliberately ignored. That the booklet by Koval was only 
                                                          
301
 For a photo of the “Stalin Square” in Dalian with the stele and soldier, i.e. before the transferal, see Lüshun tushi 
(2012), p. 259. See also Ivanov et al. (1997), p. 10 and p. 70. As mentioned above, the stele with soldier of 1953 had 
replaced the earlier Soviet stele of victory which was moved to Jinzhou’s railway station and now stands in front of 
the Jinzhou “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery”. 
302
 Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 195. 
303
 See Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 57. 
304
 See Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 6 and pp. 56-64. It is notable that the e-book Port Arthur (see below) which is closely 
connected to Medvedev does not mention the Yeltsin visit at all! There are photos (e-book Port Arthur, p. 46) of the 
2006 Medvedev visit in company of the Russian ambassador to China which sometimes is called “private” (e.g. e-
book Port Arthur, p. 47) but was of course carefully scripted and accompanied. It should be also remembered that 
Lüshun as a naval base was still not open for free visits at the time. A further larger invited group visit mentioned by 
Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 256-257, was by Russian veterans in the context of the 60th anniversary of the war’s end in 
2005, including, e.g., Vasily Ivanov, the vice-head of the Sino-Russian friendship association and co-author of the 
1997 survey. 
305
 The documentary is still available on DVD: Dalian wangshi: Sulian hongjun zai Lüda 大连往事。苏联红军在
旅大 (Dalian’s past: The Soviet Red Army in Lüda), Dalian Radio and TV 2015. I am grateful to a local history 
professor for providing it for me. 




published in Russian and in Russia with scant mention of Zhang Daxian and not directly 
addressing the financing and further background is also to be noted. De facto, on the Russian 
side, one of the richest men in Russia and member of the State Duma, Andrei Skoch, financed 
the restoration in 2008 to 2010, as an on-spot plaque reveals. For his efforts via his charity 
foundation “Pokolenie” (Generation) to memorialize Russian soldiers who died in China, he was 
honored by Russian then-president Medvedev in 2010.
306
 As one may conclude, the endeavor of 
Koval to take stock of the Lüshun cemetery together with Zhang Daxian was done in that 
context.
307
 For Skoch, one of the motivations was obviously to counter “PR strategies” of the US 
in China by making clear that the Soviets/Russians had contributed substantially militarily to war 
efforts in China’s interest.308 The project was included into a larger Public Relations initiative in 
cooperation with entrepreneur Kirill Elizarov who won a Silver Archer Award in 2010 for 
“development of public relations between Russia and China” by setting up an English language 
e-book Port Arthur, adding various Russian-language video clips, all called “Port Arthur”, 
including an art video with performance and music, designed “for the wives, brides, girlfriends 
and mothers” of the fallen and thus “civil” and emotional in outlook.309 Although Koval appears 
on several photos and video clips, the connection of the Koval booklet, the Ministry of Defense 
which hosts the memorial websites and sent the fact-finding missions before, the e-book “Port 
Arthur” and the “Pokolenie” foundation of the Duma member Skoch to act as a “private funding 
agency” is not made explicit. As it seems, the Russians tried to play by the Chinese rules to not 
jeopardize the whole. 
 
In fact, it is quite striking, when comparing Chinese available source on the cemetery, and 
Russian ones, that two largely different narratives emerge. The role of officially private Russian 
funding and its de facto close connection to Russian politics tells much about the relationship 
between Russia and China, mirrored in this (and the other Russian) cemeteries. The whole 
background from the Russian point of view is addressed in a more detailed fashion in the named 
e-book Port Arthur.
310
 It is not stated why it was made available in English, but since the aim is 
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 See “Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 13 dekabrya 2010 g. N 1556 «O nagrazhdenii ordenom Pocheta Skocha A.V.»” 
(Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 13, 2010, no. 1556 "On awarding an Order to Hon. 
Skoch A. V."). Available online: http://onagradah.ru/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-ot-13-dekabrya-2010-g-n-1556-o-nagrazhde 
nii-ordenom-pocheta-skocha-a-v/#. 
307
 Cf. the e-booklet Port Arthur on this project where Koval also appears on the pictures, as does Skoch. See 
http://www.funcommunications.com/public-relations/port-arthur. For a video clip on the restoration of the cemetery 
with Skoch and Koval, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8o0vvCj1Z7o.  
308
 See the e-booklet Port Arthur, p. 17. 
309
 Cf. Elizarov’s Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVqr5XizxsaF6rEixARtc1A. The art 
project is called “No war stop the war”. Elizarov has been an invited speaker at the World Economic Davos Forum. 
See http://www.forumdavos.com/people/115. Here his award is highlighted in the following terms: “He received 
this award for ‘best of the best’ PR practices in the Russian Federation for ‘Project PORT ARTHUR (China) and 
Other Military Memorials Overseas as an Instrument for the advancement of Russia's international reputation’”. The 
Silver Archer Award is set up to encourage Russian PR activities on a national and global scale. 
310
 However, not all claims made in this Russian publication should be taken at face value either, e.g. the claim that 
the area was threatened by urban development and that the project thus was a last-minute “saving” of the place, 




public relations and to counter, in the end, US narratives on WW II in the Far East to put the 
Soviet Union back on record, not surprising. The e-book makes clear that the Chinese side was 
adamant in keeping the whole project as low-key as possible, requesting a strict “information 
embargo”,311 which also explains why one does not easily come across the materials. In fact, 
only on-spot visits where the funding is briefly acknowledged on a plaque, set the trail for 
digging deeper.  
 
The Russian view on the Lüshun cemetery, which is not without reason also referred to with the 
“Western” name “Port Arthur”, an emotionally charged place name in Russia ever since the 
Russo-Japanese War,
312
 is closely connected to the military, either tsarist or Soviet, seeing all 
these dead as “compatriots” who died for the fatherland (and the Tsar or Stalin, depending on the 
times). The Russian project leaders, however, acknowledge that the Chinese strictly 
differentiated between the Soviet “positive” part and the “invading army” tsarist part which they 
objected to. Thus, a key strategy from the Russian side was to use the 65th anniversary of the end 
of WW II (2010) as the frame into which the restoration of the cemetery should be integrated: 
this experience is shared by China and Russia, and it is the key point to argue for China’s being 
“indebted” to Russia because of the August 1945 Soviet “liberation” of Manchuria, while the 
“common enemy” was Japan. This line of argument was acceptable to the Chinese side, and thus 
the officially private restoration (in which the Russians insisted to include the tsarist part on 
promise to keep it low-key) was officially inaugurated in 2010 with a group of veterans of the 
1945 campaign.  
 
A problem connected to 1945, though, was the commemoration dating: the worldwide perception 
of WW II’s end is connected to the victory over Hitler (May 8, in Russia: May 9). The other key 
date is the Tennô’s declaration of surrender of August 15. However, in Manchuria fighting went 
on for some more days, and the final signature of capitulation on the USS Missouri was in early 
September: in Tokyo Bay in the morning which in the US was still September 2. Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
might have been told by the Chinese, but is not very credible, given the fact that the area is still quite peripheral, the 
Soviet part is a Chinese protected unit since the 1980s, and the Chinese “martyrs” being in the cemetery aside (see 
below). It might have served as an argument on the Russian side, though, to point out the urgency of the project (and 
to ask for potential contributions to the effort). 
311
 As it seems, the Russians only partly kept that promise regarding the Russian public, as they also wanted to 
generate funds and to get into contact with veterans and families. On the Chinese side, though, the information 
embargo was enforced. (See, e.g., Part Arthur e-book p. 41). It is suggested that the Chinese price politics in 
massively driving up costs for restoration by asking wages for laborers based on US wages (!), was deliberate and an 
additional means to discourage further such projects. (Ibid. p. 43 and p. 53). 
312
 Since the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in the Russian strong-hold Port Arthur after the long siege was as 
traumatic on land as the Tsushima battle on sea, the name also easily evokes a lot of emotions in Russia. It might be 
only shortly noted that the novel already referred to above on the Russo-Japanese War, Port Arthur: A Historical 
Narrative of Aleksandr Stepanov, written during WW II, won a Stalin prize after the war during the time the Soviets 
had occupied the place again to make good for the “humiliation” of 1904. 




question of inclusion of the September memorialization entailed the issues of the importance of 
the Pacific War vs. the European War, the importance of the US vs. the Soviet Union in the 
Pacific War/East Asian war theatre, and connected to that the dating: East Asian time or US time. 
In the eyes of the Russian Far East, if one commemorated the Far Eastern war theatre, it had to 
be September 3, and in fact Stalin had commemorated it once in 1946 on that day. Afterwards, 
though, also in Russian eyes the European War theatre’s end in May was the key date to 
commemorate. This left the Far Eastern parts of the Soviet Union and the Russian veterans of 
that short, but still bloody war dissatisfied,
313
 and as the September date involves also the issues 
over Sakhalin and the Kuril islands which the Soviets took from Japan in 1945,
 314
  the question 
of commemoration involved the Russian-Japanese relationship and territorial claims unresolved 
between them. Thus, when Russian then-president Medvedev toured the East in 2010, his tour 
was designed to go from the Lüshun cemetery over Beijing and the Shanghai Expo (the main 
reason for the visit) up to Sakhalin and the Kuril islands, provoking the Japanese doubly. The 
mounting Russian-Japanese tensions finally made the Russians also reconsider the idea to 
integrate the September date into the canon of celebratory days, too, and thus in 2010, the 
“internationally used” September 2 (not September 3) was taken up and installed officially.315 (In 
the PRC, though, at the 70th anniversary, i.e. in 2015, a huge victory parade was held on the East 




Given the complicated diplomatic issues around the early September date, in 2010, Russian then-
president Medvedev preferred to visit the cemetery rather later in September during his 
programmed state visit to China where he met also with Chinese “veterans” to drive home the 
message of Sino-Russian “common fight” against the Japanese. The trip to the Kuril Islands was 
at that point, however, postponed.
317
 At his trip to Lüshun, Medvedev who is of the United 
Russia Party, however, had also invited representatives of the politically rivalling Russian 
Communist Party, and the Chinese, in turn, included in the group of “Chinese veterans” 
Medvedev was to meet also Li Min 李敏, daughter of Mao Zedong who had been in the Soviet 
Union herself in young years (and is de facto no “veteran”)!318 The trip thus was very multi-
layered, providing images of the head of the Russian Communist Party Zyuganov appearing 
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 Cf. the e-book Port Arthur, p. 51. The Soviet casualties of the war of which most were buried in Manchuria, were 
over 8.000. See Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 15. As mentioned, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov even spoke of 12.000. 
314
 For the Soviet offensive, the so-called “August storm”, and the consequences for Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands 
from the Russian point of view, see Glantz (2003), esp. chapters 9 and 10. 
315
 See the e-book Port Arthur, which names as 4 key results of the project: 1. The biggest non-governmental Sino-
Russian project solved a state problem; 2.the biggest historical military memorial in Asia has been restored; 3. the 
Russian claim in the argument between Russia and Japan about the “northern territories” has been emphasized; 4. 
the V-Japan Day has been put back on the memorial days’ list. (There pp. 68-73.) 
316
 Interestingly, in Japan the usually provided dating of the surrender signature is also September 2, i.e. in accord 
with the US, while the Chinese follow Stalin, so to speak. 
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 Cf. e-book Port Arthur p. 55. 
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daughter of He Zizhen 贺子珍 and Mao, had lived 1941-1947 in the Soviet Union as a child.  




under a cross, but also a photo shooting of Mao’s daughter Li Min (who is said to deplore the 
fact that she had not had the occasion to do it with Stalin) now with Medvedev as a 
representative of the country “that brought us Communism, Marxism and Stalinism”!319 For the 
Russian side, the Medvedev visit was, however, the ideal moment to temporarily get out of the 





The restoration of the cemetery, which the Russians had also different ideas about in terms of 
techniques than the Chinese,
321
 entailed for the Russian side all buried in the Lüshun cemetery. 
As this also included Muslims and Jews of tsarist times, also a rabbi and a mufti were invited to 
the opening, together with an orthodox priest who also officially accompanied the installation of 
the new St. Nicholas the Wonderworker icon on the tsarist cross for the casualties of the Russo-





But also inner-Russian debates are reflected in this project: notably, apart from the Ministry of 
Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Russian embassy in China, who are all 
partners that could be expected and had cared about the military cemeteries in China already 
earlier,
323
 the Russian Presidential Administration and the “Commission for the Countering of 
False Revision of Russian History” (established in 2009 by Russian then-president Medvedev) 
are named as the ones “ordering” the project. This shows not only how high-level the project was, 
but that it was also connected to the attempts to counter “false” history views, intending the 
criticism towards the Soviet Union and “denial” of Soviet contributions to WW II in Russia, the 
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former Soviet Republics and beyond.
324
 Since in present-day Russia the tsarist times are re-
appreciated and also seen as potentially more unifying vis-à-vis the more divisive Soviet times, it 
comes as no surprise that the tsarist part of the cemetery is emphasized in the project financed by 
Andrei Skoch.
325
 This project, furthermore, was seen only as one step in the larger scheme to 
preserve and reconstruct military grave sites as a State Target Program 2011-2015,
326
 which 
means that also other Russian/Soviet cemeteries in China were then integrated into that state 
target program. As noted above, also the Qingyunjie and the Jinzhou Cemetery were “treated” at 
the time, which led up to the 70th anniversary of the end of WW II in 2015. As mentioned, part 
of the motivation therefore was to counter the perceived well-organized US efforts to honor their 
fallen who contributed to the worldwide (and to China’s) battle against the Japanese as much as 
against Hitler which suggested the more important role of the Americans vis-à-vis the Russians 
in WW II.
327
 Thus, Russia needed “PR campaigns” to make sure its role was re-appreciated also 
in China. 
 
An additional problem, however, is, that the former “Soviet” (and in part tsarist) cemeteries, 
though often seen today simply as “Russian”, also cover other parts of the Soviet Union (Russian 
Empire) now being separate states. Thus, when celebrations of WW II’s end took place from the 
Chinese side, they also invited further diplomatic representatives, although it is not known 
whether those countries cared for “their” tombs in Lüshun or Dalian and Jinzhou. Some of those 
would also rather not like to memorialize their “Sovietized” past, above all if it is connected to 
the Red Army. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Lüshun “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” (in Chinese 
parlance), different from the other Soviet cemeteries we have addressed, has been joined by the 
Chinese “martyrs cemetery” [ill. 61, 62]. Here, the Chinese “volunteers” in the Korean War 
waged close-by were to be buried,
328
 thus linking the Communist “martyrs”/“heroes” of both 
countries with only a wall separating them, but a gate providing access from one to the other, 
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directly leading up to the Sino-Soviet friendship stele placed centrally in the Soviet Martyrs’ 
Cemetery. Notably, the Chinese cemetery includes also cadres that died normally, by this 
enlarging the concept of “martyr” and calling the cemetery also “August One”, i.e. with the 
founding date of the Chinese Red Army, today’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in spite of 
hosting also civil cadres. According to an on-spot plaque, this cemetery was set up in 1951 
already and thus renamed as a “martyrs’” one only years after the Korean war, i.e. in 1956. The 
“Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery”, called this way since 1955, is, as mentioned, notably a Chinese 
patriotic education and heritage site, and thus the Soviet “martyrs” may be visited together with 
the adjoining Chinese ones by school classes etc. for whom the Chinese “martyrs’ cemetery” is 
an “outdoor education base”.329 In fact, whereas the Dalian Qingyunjie and the Jinzhou cemetery 
are closed off (and not with a Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery aside),330 the Lüshun Soviet and 
Chinese Martyrs’ Cemeteries are open to visitors. Today, furthermore, Lüshun district tries to 
use its multi-faceted past for attracting tourists.
331
 There are even some who would like to see 
Lüshun classified as a UNESCO world heritage site, de facto over its “dead”, in a line with 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima, though!
332
 On the other hand, the Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery also has 
been made to serve for youth exchange programs between Russia and China, centrally done in 
the more relaxed holiday atmosphere of the Dalian beaches, but including an “educative trip” to 
Lüshun’s cemetery.333 In Lüshun, the Chinese “credentials” of the fight against the Japanese are 
also underlined by naming a park after local “hero” Jin Boyang 金伯阳, a Lüshun native who 
died in guerilla activities against the Japanese in 1933. Although he did not die in Lüshun, the 
“Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery” hosts a surrogate tomb (yiguanzhong 衣冠冢) for him as is 
Chinese custom when remains have not been available (or are elsewhere) [ill. 63].
334
 This 
“Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery” with over 350 tombs was also renovated in 2010, obviously to not 
stay behind the Russian initiatives next door. Among the tombs, there are notably also Chinese 
casualties of the Vietnam War when China helped the North Vietnamese against the US [ill. 
                                                          
329
 In 1997, the whole Lüshunkou area was designed as a provincial-level patriotic education showcase district. See 
Dalianshi Lüshunkouqu shizhi bangongshi 大连市旅顺口区史志办公室 and Dalianshi jindaishi yanjiusuo 大连市
近代史研究所 (eds.): Zhonggong Lüshunkouqu difangshi, 1949-2011 中共旅顺口区地方史 ， 1949-2011 (Local 
history of the Chinese Communist Party in the Lüshunkou District, 1949-2011), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu 
chubanshe 2013, p. 895. See also Lüshunkou quzhi (1986-2005) 旅顺口区志 (1986-2005) (Lüshunkou district 
gazetteer 1986-2005), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2013, p. 540. 
330
 The same holds true for Harbin (see above). 
331
 E.g., glossy illustrated multi-language publications on historical sites have been designed. See, e.g., Meili 
Lüshunkou 魅力旅顺口 (Fascinating Lüshunkou), Beijing: Zhongguo shying chubanshe 2011; or Lü Tongju 吕同举 
(ed.): Shenmi de Lüshun 神秘的旅顺 (“Mysterious Lushun”),  Beijing: Zhongguo lüyyou chubanshe 2009. 
332
 See Liu Junyong 刘俊勇 : “Dalian wenhua yichan baohu yanjiu” 大连文化遗产保护研究  (Study of the 
conservation of cultural heritage in Dalian). In: Dalian jindaishi yanjiu 大连近代史研究 (Studies of the Modern 
History of Dalian), vol. 6, 2009, pp. 501-512, there p. 511. This refers to the First Sino-Japanese War with the 
Lüshun Massacre, the Russo-Japanese War, the ”August Storm” of 1945 and the Korean War of which casualties are 
all present in Lüshun. To this, the “anti-Japanese resistance fighters” killed in the Lüshun prison can be added. 
333
 Cf. Ma Dianwen (2015), pp. 103-105. 
334
 Although the plaque at the entrance of the cemetery admits this to be only a surrogate tomb, on spot the memorial 
set up in 1981 does not mention this [cf. ill. 63]. 






  And one may find even Communist-starred tombs with offerings in front – showing that 
although cadres are forbidden officially to adhere to any religion, traditional mourning rites are 





The cases above have reflected through the lens of cemeteries the multi-facetted roles Russia/the 
Soviet Union has played in China’s history and the divergent views on single facets of these 
roles between both countries. While views might differ, physical remains are a fact to deal with. 
They involve practical matters as well as perceptions and value judgements. They embody 
national issues but are also individual and private, though families might long have left or have 
never lived there. Some died “for a cause”, others did by chance, age, illness or accident in a 
foreign land some, though, had come to call home, e.g. the so-called Harbiners. The cemeteries 
are also culturally and religiously inscribed, and they raise questions about identity ascriptions. 
Since they cover space, issues of sovereignty are attached to them: who owns the space? Who 
may decide over land use? And who should be memorialized and who not? Who decides? Given 
the fact that but for Harbin’s orthodox cemetery, the other cases discussed here are exclusively 
“foreign”, they necessarily involve diplomatic issues. The military component, furthermore, is 
especially complicating things since China has no tradition of keeping also cemeteries of foreign 
soldiers, let alone former enemy ones.
336
 And if they should be kept officially, because they 
“helped China” as the Soviets did, they are also to underline that China is exceptional in keeping 
to that tradition “faithfully” (while others have not). This is connected on the one hand to the 
“apostasy” of the former Communist countries, be it the Baltic States or Eastern Europe where 
Soviet “liberation” has been criticized as “oppression”, most notably in the case of Estonia where 
the violent contestations about dismantling a Soviet memorial or not have been reported also in 
China, seeing behind the move “ungratefulness” and a “distortion of history”.337 On the other, 
Russia’s own balancing out vis-à-vis the Soviet heritage is challenged, showing that the Chinese 
are the “true heirs”. Needless to say, in China the memorialization is appropriated by the state to 
guarantee it stays in the limits politically correct at a given time. For a “normal Chinese”, such 
foreign cemeteries are, however, also a visible and tangible way to encounter close to home 
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another way of dealing with a fate all living beings share. Apart from the Soviet cemeteries 
which have exerted influence on the way the PRC frames the memorialization of her own 
“martyrs”, the Orthodox and Jewish cemeteries tell of another “West” which is not only 
“imperialist”, “militarist”, or “capitalist”, but also religious, and for good or for worse is 
intermingled historically with China. The ambivalence demonstrated on the Chinese (official) 
side that has been documented in the above, is therefore not only an attitude towards the other, 
but, willy-nilly, involves also self-perceptions in China. 
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